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The national economy and the vital commercial flows that feed it are the sine 
quibus non of national influence, power, and security. However, new characteristics of 
the modern trade environment have the potential to undermine U.S. economic prosperity. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) claims that homeland security is 
inseparable from economic security and, as such, that the department has a role to play in 
supporting national economic security goals. However, DHS has yet to fully reconcile the 
tension between its trade enforcement and facilitation missions and clarify its role in 
supporting national economic competitiveness goals. After identifying and assessing 
several policy alternatives, this paper concludes that DHS should aggressively leverage 
its unique border authorities to influence a shift toward a more centralized model of 
government controls of imports, one informed by economy-wide strategic objectives and 
reliant upon standard performance measures, shared funding schemes, common 
information technology infrastructures, and delegated decision making on the 
admissibility of goods. Such an effort could provide commercially meaningful benefits to 
public and private stakeholders alike while maintaining security and safety requirements. 
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This thesis explores the role of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
its component U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in supporting national 
economic security and competitiveness goals in light of the department’s assertion that 
homeland security is “inseparable from economic security,” and CBP’s claim that part of 
its mission is to “enhanc[e] the Nation’s global economic competitiveness.”1 
This thesis asserts that the national economy and the vital commercial flows that 
feed it are the sine quibus non of national influence, power, and security, but that new 
characteristics of the modern trade environment brought about by globalization and post-
9/11 security requirements have the potential to endanger the United States’ economic 
prosperity.2 In asserting that homeland security is “inseparable from economic security,” 
and affirming that part of its mission is to “enhanc[e] the Nation’s global economic 
competitiveness,” DHS bears responsibility for addressing these challenges and concerns. 
What this role entails and whether or not DHS is able to reconcile the apparent tension 
between its trade enforcement and facilitation missions could inform a recasting of 
current priorities, policies, and operational processes and allow the U.S. government as a 
whole to better accommodate itself to the dynamic requirements of global commerce and 
influence future trends.  
This thesis focused primarily on DHS (specifically CBP) policies and activities 
associated with cross-border trade, with a particular emphasis on imported goods. CBP, 
and by extension DHS, contributes to the nation’s economic security directly by 
collecting revenue and enforcing laws that keep citizens safe and protect American 
businesses from unfair trade practices. However, the recent narrative in CBP messaging 
                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(Washington, DC: DHS, 2014), 31, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-
508.pdf; Customs and Border Protection, Vision and Strategy 2020: U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: DHS), 3, 7, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-
Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf.  
2 The term sine quibus non means “something absolutely indispensable or essential.” See Merriam-
Webster, s.v., “sine qua non,” accessed June 17, 2017, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/sine%20qua%20non. 
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suggests a deeper commitment to trade facilitation—a commitment to advancing the 
goals of the concept as an affirmative rather than an ancillary responsibility. In this 
regard, CBP has sought to emphasize much more than its traditional revenue functions 
when noting its contribution to economic security; the agency focuses as well on efforts 
to streamline and simplify an array of additional government controls on cross-border 
trade. These controls include not only a burgeoning number of post-9/11 security 
measures, but also health and safety, phytosanitary, sanitary, and environmental 
requirements. 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that DHS (particularly CBP) is uniquely situated 
to expand its trade facilitation mission beyond revenue collection and minimize the 
impact of necessary security/compliance enforcement missions. By influencing or even 
leading a broader U.S. government-wide scheme of coordinated border management, the 
department could signal an affirmative commitment to the trade facilitation aspect of its 
mission. In short, this thesis suggests that DHS can and should aggressively leverage its 
unique border authorities to remedy some of the inefficiencies caused by the current 
decentralized manner in which the U.S. government as a whole manages the processing 
and ensures the security of imported goods.  
After reviewing the characteristics and challenges posed by the modern trade 
environment, the thesis explores the evolving concept of trade facilitation and associated 
benefits to public and private stakeholders alike. In general, trade facilitation activities 
involve “expediting the movement, release, and clearance of goods,” such as the 
simplification, harmonization, and modernization of government rules, processes, and 
requirements.3 According to the World Economic Forum, worldwide improvement of 
trade facilitation measures “even halfway to the world’s best practices” could increase the 
                                                 
3 World Trade Organization, “Agreement on Trade Facilitation,” July 15, 2014, 1, 
http://tfig.unece.org/pdf_files/931.pdf; Edward Gresser, “Trade Facilitation as a Growth Tool,” Progressive 
Economy, July 17, 2013, http://www.progressive-economy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/trade.facil 
itation.pdf.  
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global gross domestic product (GDP) six times more than removing all tariffs.4 This 
translates into an addition of 2.8% to the United States’ GDP.5  
The thesis then assesses DHS’s current authorities and mission with regard to 
international commerce, a role shared with twenty-three entities across fifteen 
departments or independent agencies.6 While not directly responsible for establishing 
national trade policy, laws, or strategic objectives, DHS is responsible for enforcing these 
policies and laws and advancing these objectives.7 However, DHS’s efforts are 
complicated by the speed and complexity of the trade environment and the Sisyphean 
task of driving action among the dozens of different U.S. agencies with hundreds of 
border-related requirements while maintaining the stated commitment to both trade 
facilitation and enforcement.  
Relying on trade facilitation indexes and national rankings provided by the World 
Economic Forum, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, this thesis then identifies potential improvements that DHS might support 
(i.e., activities that DHS can influence or undertake within its authorities and mission) to 
enhance the cross-border flows of imported goods. The data suggest that the United 
States remains behind global leaders in the “border administration” indicator category as 
assessed by the World Economic Forum, the “customs” category as assessed by the 
World Bank, and three out of the four trade facilitation indicators (automation, 
documentation, and procedures) as assessed by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development.8  
                                                 
4 World Economic Forum, Enabling Trade: Valuing Growth Opportunities (Geneva: World Economic 
Forum, 2013), 4, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_SCT_EnablingTrade_Report_2013.pdf. 
5 Gresser, “Trade Facilitation.” 
6 “Mission of the USTR,” United States Trade Representative, accessed March 19, 2017, 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/about-ustr. 
7 DHS and other departments and agencies are therefore answerable to both the United States Trade 
Representative and the National Economic Council, who themselves are responsible for developing trade 
policies and ensuring that the goals of the national trade agenda “are being effectively pursued.” See 
William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12835—Establishment of the National Economic Council 
(Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, January 25, 1993), Section 4.  
8 The “border administration” category measures the effectiveness of the clearance process at the 
border, the time and cost required to import goods into a specific nation, the number of documents required 
for import, and the efficiency of relevant customs administrations. 
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Based on these findings, the thesis offers three strategic-level policy options by 
which DHS could improve U.S. scores in these areas, thereby potentially improving the 
facilitation of cross-border commerce and supporting broader national competitiveness 
goals. These three policy options are:  
1. Maintaining the Status Quo: DHS can stay the course, leading other 
agencies by its own example of modernization and commitment to the 
dual goals of trade enforcement and facilitation.  
2. Tailored Modernization: DHS can lead a program of collective action 
among a select group of agencies to improve trade facilitation in key areas 
most likely to exceed the “tipping point” necessary to result in meaningful 
benefits.  
3. Shifting the Paradigm: DHS can advocate for a shift toward a more 
centralized model of government controls of imports, one reliant upon 
standard performance measures, shared funding schemes, common IT 
infrastructures, and/or delegated or joint decision-making on the 
admissibility of goods.  
After introducing each of the policy options in greater detail, this thesis 
analytically assesses them according to three criteria: 1) the impact on the effectiveness 
and efficiency of overall import procedures; 2) the impacts on American businesses; and 
3) the feasibility of implementing the policy.  
This thesis concludes with a recommendation for policy option 3 as the best 
means for DHS to achieve its stated goal of pursuing both security and trade efficiency as 
mutual, rather than mutually exclusive, goals; policy option 3 also allows DHS to 
contribute most to ensuring the nation’s economic security. Under this approach, DHS 
would lead a paradigm shift away from the current de-centralized model of government 
control, in which agencies understandably prioritize efforts to advance their individual 
missions and make admissibility decisions on cargo based on varying risk-management 
cultures and resource levels. Instead, DHS would position itself to overcome these 
challenges by drawing authority from trade policy-makers (specifically, the United States 
Trade Representative and the National Economic Council) to institute common 
principles, policies, and practices at the border among relevant agencies toward the 
ultimate goal of implementing an economy-wide vision of desired performance 
outcomes.  
 xix 
To implement such an approach, DHS would work to divest itself of the 
responsibilities to maintain and operate the national Single Window through new 
partnerships with private-sector experts. DHS also would obtain expanded authorities to 
strengthen its role as the chair of the Border Interagency Executive Council while 
situating that interagency body within the National Trade Facilitation Committee process, 
an established framework for strategic U.S. policy-making. With this new imprimatur, 
DHS could drive a new program of collective action among a group of U.S. government 
agencies that have specific responsibilities to ensure the security of goods at the border 
and their compliance with national laws. This thesis concludes that such an effort could 
improve trade facilitation and provide commercially meaningful benefits to public and 
private stakeholders alike. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Globalization … enables us to reach into the world as never before, and it 
enables the world to reach into each of us as never before. 
—Thomas L. Friedman1 
 
This thesis seeks to answer the following question: What is the role of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in supporting national economic security and 
competitiveness goals, and can that role be enhanced?  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
As one of the world’s top trading nations, the United States depends upon the 
importation and exportation of trillions of dollars’ worth of goods each year to support its 
defense capabilities and way of life, provide jobs for citizens, and fuel economic 
prosperity at home and competitiveness abroad.2 In addition, the nation’s strong economy 
not only provides a foundation for military might, but has increasingly become an 
effective instrument on its own when pursuing broader national and foreign policy 
objectives. As Michael Froman, the former United States Trade Representative explains,  
Trade bolsters the most fundamental source of our power, the U.S. 
economy. But what has changed is that economic clout, in many respects, 
is now the principal yardstick by which power itself is measured … if the 
                                                 
1 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999), 19. 
2 “World Economic Outlook Report: Groups and Aggregates Database,” International Monetary Fund, 
accessed March 25, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States held the top position as the world’s 
largest economy for 142 years before being overtaken in 2014 by China. The IMF calculations are based on 
the purchasing-power parity (or PPP), one of several established economic measures to assess a country’s 
economic growth rates and contribution to the global economy relative to other nations. PPP calculations 
offer a means of comparison between what money can buy in different countries when accounting for 
things like the cost of living, otherwise known as an output measure. PPP calculations differ from market-
based measures, which compare economies according to the rate of their currency in the foreign exchange 
market. While China has surpassed the United States under PPP adjustments, market-based calculations for 
the same 2014 timeframe offer a different perspective and show the U.S. economy ($16.27 trillion) as 
almost twice as large as the Chinese economy ($8.06). However, the fact that the United States holds either 
the first- or second-place position among world economies (depending on the calculation measures used) 
does not affect this paper’s underlying assumptions or impact its findings.  
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U.S. leads on trade, its influence will expand. And if we don’t, others will 
fill the gap. And I can assure you, their vision will be at variance with 
American values and American interests.3  
Simply put, the national economy and the vital commercial flows that feed it are the sine 
quibus non of national influence, power, and security.4  
However, new characteristics of the modern trade environment have the potential 
to undermine U.S. economic prosperity. Globalization, while enabling exponential 
growth in international trade, also has created a complex web of interconnected supply 
chains that amplify nations’ collective vulnerability to shocks resulting from even 
localized threats or disruptions. In addition, companies seeking to take advantage of 
cheap transportation costs, an abundance of new technological advances, and attractive 
labor markets increasingly rely upon geographically diverse and fragile business models 
in which phases of production are no longer tied by proximity to the end consumer and 
lean inventories depend upon “just in time” delivery schedules. These commercial 
practices have occasioned the rise of new and more flexible business models and 
alternative means of production, but have also created a global supply chain more 
susceptible to market volatility and other system shocks. A final characteristic of the new 
trading system, and the most relevant to this thesis, is the spate of government controls 
established in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks. These new laws, 
requirements, and programs gave rise to a host of regulatory and operational complexities 
at the border and, regardless of their arguable security value, increased costs for both 
government regulators and those seeking to do business with and in the United States. As 
one commenter noted less than six months after the attacks, “the post 9-11 economy faces 
a subtle new reality: Call it friction. It’s as if fine sand has been sprinkled into the gears 
of American business.”5  
                                                 
3 Michael Froman, “U.S. Trade Negotiations Aim to Raise Labor and Environmental Standards,” 
Council on Foreign Relations, June 16, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/event/us-trade-negotiations-aim-raise-
labor-and-environmental-standards.  
4 The term sine quibus non means “something absolutely indispensable or essential.” See Merriam-
Webster, s.v., “sine qua non,” accessed June 17, 2017, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/sine%20qua%20non.  
5 Anna Bernasek, “The Friction Economy,” Fortune 145, no. 4 (February 2002): 104–110.  
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Problematically, the new trade environment is still supported and enabled by 
policies, processes, and information communication technologies constructed in and for a 
previous century. The evolving characteristics of the modern trading environment 
challenge federal stakeholders to bring all tools to bear to maintain and promote national 
economic prosperity and, by extension, national economic security.  
DHS has an important role in this space—one with a tradition dating back to 1789 
with the establishment of the U.S. Customs Service by the First Congress. Placed under 
the Department of Treasury at the time, the Customs Service was to focus exclusively on 
revenue collection activities, specifically to “regulate the Collection of the Duties 
imposed by law on the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandise 
imported into the United States.”6 The revenues constituted the primary source of income 
for the fledgling nation, up to approximately 95 percent by the turn of the century.7 By 
2003, when the Customs Service became the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
under the newly established Department of Homeland Security, import duties had 
dwindled to between 2–4 percent of the federal revenue and collection functions had 
come to pale in comparison to the agency’s enforcement of literally hundreds of security, 
environment, health and safety, and sanitary and phytosanitary requirements for imported 
goods.8 The “new CBP” inherited a long list of legislative authorities, many of which 
were based on or introduced as amendments to foundational provisions in the Tariff Act 
                                                 
6 Acts of the Fifth Congress, 1 Stat 24 (July 4, 1789) (tariffs); 1 Stat 27 (July 20, 1789) (tonnage); 1 
Stat 29 (July 31, 1789) (customs); and 1 Stat 65 (September 2, 1789) (Treasury); see https://www.loc.gov/ 
law/help/statutes-at-large/5th-congress/c5.pdf.  
7 Carl E. Prince and Mollie Keller, The U.S. Customs Service: A Bicentennial History (Washington, 
DC: Department of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, 1989), vi.  
8 Executive Order 13228 of October 8, 2001, established the Office of Homeland Security and the 
Homeland Security Council, followed by congressional passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
(P.L. 107-296), which consolidated parts of twenty-two different departments and agencies into the new 
DHS. 
 4 
of 1930, which prescribed customs powers to search and seize illicitly imported goods 
and assess penalties when necessary.9  
CBP more recently has introduced and is working to develop a narrative that ties 
its mission to enforce compliance of U.S. trade laws and ensure the security of imports 
and exports to a broader trade facilitation agenda and, by extension, to establish itself as a 
defender of the nation’s economic security. The CBP message has been that trade 
enforcement and trade facilitation are mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually 
exclusive goals; by this CBP means that by focusing limited resources on identifying 
prohibited imports or illicit contraband, the cross-border flow of legitimate imports 
moves faster. In this way, CBP offers a means by which they can work to overcome the 
tension between enforcing U.S. trade laws and securing trans-border flows of goods, and 
improving the speed and efficiency of the import process. The message has been adopted 
at the department level, and amplified in important strategy documents that establish 
DHS’s long-term policy objectives. The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(QHSR) report provides the most recent and intriguingly ambiguous policy articulation of 
the relationship between DHS’s law enforcement and border security mission and the 
nation’s economic security. The strategy documents states, for the first time in the 
department’s history, that homeland security is “inseparable from economic security.”10 
This statement indicates that DHS, as the organization responsible for homeland security, 
has a role to play in supporting national economic security goals. What this role entails, 
and whether or not DHS is able to reconcile the apparent tension between its economic 
and border security missions, is not yet clear and offers an interesting topic of analysis.  
                                                 
9 Other key legislation establishing and authorizing the customs revenue-specific functions of the U.S. 
Customs Service, and later trade-related functions of the CBP under tDHS, include: P.L. 103-465, the 
Customs Simplification Act of 1953 (P.L. 243), the Reorganization Plan of 1965 (as amended P.L. 90-83), 
the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (P.L. 103-182), the Trade Act of 2002 
(P.L. 107-210), The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347), the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), and most recently the 
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125).  
10 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 




The still-evolving nature of DHS’s mission space provides a good opportunity for 
a strategic re-evaluation of how DHS could better leverage, or even expand, specific 
aspects of its unique border authorities to more affirmatively contribute to or even 
promote U.S. government economic competitiveness goals. This thesis takes, as its 
starting point, the assumptions that:  
• national economy and the vital commercial flows that feed it are the sine 
quibus non of national influence, power, and security; 
• DHS is a fundamental part of, and plays a leadership role in the homeland 
security enterprise through the establishment of strategic policies and 
objectives that inform and/or support activities across the broader 
homeland security enterprise; and 
• while a single, definitive definition of trade facilitation has not yet 
crystalized, the World Trade Organization’s definition can be used—in 
this definition, trade facilitation means “expediting the movement, release, 
and clearance of goods.”11 
Based on these three assumptions, the thesis explores the premise that, if 
homeland security supports and “is inseparable from economic security,” as asserted in 
the 2014 QHSR, DHS as an organization should affirmatively support and be inseparable 
from economic security.12 Specifically, it evaluates the hypothesis: DHS can and should 
aggressively leverage its unique border authorities to address the current decentralized, 
antiquated, and inefficient manner in which the U.S. government as a whole manages the 
processing and ensures the security of imported and exported goods.  
An enhanced understanding of the circumstances in which integration of the two 
concepts (homeland and economic security) might be beneficial, dangerous, or even 
inconsequential could inform DHS’s efforts to deliver on its stated principles.13 
                                                 
11 World Trade Organization, “Agreement on Trade Facilitation,” July 15, 2014, 1, http://tfig.une 
ce.org/pdf_files/931.pdf.  
12 DHS, 2014 QHSR, 31. 
13 The statements that homeland security “supports” and “is inseparable from economic security” 
were in DHS’s 2014 QHSR. DHS develops the QHSR pursuant to Section 707 of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), as amended by the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53).  
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Additionally, such an understanding could inform a recasting of current priorities, 
policies, and operational processes that may be better suited to the trade agenda of  the 
Trump administration. Regardless of the political party in power, an evaluation of how 
DHS can better align its priorities and support (or even influence) the action of other 
federal agencies to allow the U.S. government to better accommodate itself to the modern 
trade environment could uncover new opportunities for enhancing national and economic 
security. 
C. METHODS AND SOURCES/RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Objective of Study and Rationale 
This thesis provides a problem-based, multi-goal policy analysis that considers 
options to improve DHS’s implementation of its stated principle that homeland security 
supports economic security. The paper identifies and assesses the advantages and 
challenges of three policy options by which DHS could better achieve its stated goal of 
supporting economic security through improved trade facilitation measures. Each option 
is outlined in more detail in a later chapter; in brief, the three policy approaches are: 
1. Maintaining the Status Quo: DHS can stay the course, leading other 
agencies by its own example of modernization and commitment to the 
dual goals of trade enforcement and facilitation.  
2. Tailored Modernization: DHS can lead a program of collective action 
among a select group of agencies to improve trade facilitation in key areas 
most likely to exceed the “tipping point” necessary to result in meaningful 
benefits.  
3. Shifting the Paradigm: DHS can advocate for a shift toward a more 
centralized model of government controls of imports, one reliant upon 
standard performance measures, shared funding schemes, common IT 
infrastructures, and/or delegated or joint decision-making on the 
admissibility of goods.  
As implementation of the preferred policy could impact DHS’s future mission, 
activities across the broader homeland security enterprise, and the nation’s economic 
prosperity, an assessment of the possibilities and recommendations on best approaches is 
warranted. This thesis may inform the longer-term development of a national policy 
agenda better able to address current ambiguities associated with the role of homeland 
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security relative to other national priorities such as economic prosperity and 
competitiveness. 
2. Scope of Work 
This paper focuses primarily on DHS policies and activities associated with cross-
border trade, with a particular emphasis on imported goods, 99 percent of which are 
transported via maritime commerce. This considerable volume of maritime cargo, its 
economic impact (such cargo contributes approximately $649 billion annually to the 
gross domestic product), and its geographic scope (including approximately 3,700 marine 
terminals in the United States) make it a meaningful area of assessment.14 While 
recognizing the range of other stakeholders with equities, such as other U.S. government 
departments and agencies, the private sector, and foreign governments, this assessment 
seeks to identify beneficial and viable policy options available specifically to DHS. It 
does not focus on the movement of people or services across borders and instead 
concentrates on the policies and processes associated with tangible goods. Travel, 
tourism, and e-commerce are related and important components of any discussion of the 
security–economy dynamic; however, the distinct challenges in that environment require 
specialized treatment beyond the scope of this effort. In addition, this review does not 
reiterate but rather builds upon the large body of literature detailing the exponential 
growth in trade over the last several decades as a result of globalization, advances in 
information communication technology, and improved efficiencies in logistics and 
transportation networks.15 It acknowledges but does not review in detail the array of 
sources that explain how this exchange of commodities enables the American way of life 
and fuels our nation’s economy.  
                                                 
14 “CMTS Portal,” Maritime Administration, accessed June 17, 2017, www.marad.dot.gov/ 
ports_landing_page/marine_transportation_system/MTS.htm.     
15 For general works on the impacts of globalization on trade, see David Hummels, see 
“Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of Globalization,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 21, no. 3 (2007): 131–154; Christopher Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, and Benjamin D. 
Brewer, “Trade Globalization since 1795: Waves of Integration in the World-System,” American 
Sociological Review (2000): 77–95. 
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When discussing security in the context of cross-border trade, this paper does not 
prioritize or distinguish any among the array of threats that DHS and other agencies work 
to detect and combat. This review takes as a foundational premise the fact that criminal 
organizations, terrorists, or other bad actors seek to exploit this efficient commercial 
network to transport contraband across borders or even attack the system itself to disrupt 
its smooth functioning and undermine our economic health and sense of security.16 In 
addition, commerce arriving in the United States may carry invasive species or diseases 
harmful to domestic plants and animals or even to citizens. And, of course, natural 
disasters such as extreme weather events or man-made accidents like oil spills have the 
potential to disrupt supply chains and threaten the security of commerce. As the primary 
law enforcement agency at the border, DHS is responsible for working in coordination 
with other agencies to ensure that goods crossing national borders are secured against 
each of these distinct threats.  
3. Instrumentation (Data and Evidence) 
This thesis relies on data provided by four major international organizations, to 
include the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the World Economic Forum, to identify 
opportunities for improved facilitation of imported goods at the U.S. border and explore 
the potential economic benefits of such improvements.17 As is discussed in more detail in 
forthcoming sections, these organizations have developed an array of qualitative and 
quantitative indicators that enable the assessment of trade facilitation levels by nation, 
and even regionally or globally. While the specific indicators vary and/or overlap among 
the reports, they each reflect a common set of broader non-tariff measures that businesses 
encounter when importing. The resulting data indicate that some of the legitimate 
controls imposed by the United States government to protect domestic consumers, 
                                                 
16 For additional references on potential terrorist or criminal exploitation of supply chain 
vulnerabilities, see Andrew Grainger, “Supply Chain Security: Adding to a Complex Operational and 
Institutional Environment,” World Customs Journal 1, no. 2 (2007): 17–29; Steven Flynn, “America the 
Vulnerable,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (2002): 60–74; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States of America, 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W Norton, 2004), 390.  
17 The Appendix details the trade facilitation indicators used by the World Economic Forum, the 
World Bank, and OECD. 
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markets, businesses, and the environment may have the unintended consequence of 
increasing the cost of importing and eroding the competitiveness of American businesses.  
4. Selection Criteria and Steps of Analysis  
This thesis analytically assesses each of the suggested policy options according to 
three criteria: 1) the impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of overall import 
procedures; 2) the impacts on American businesses; and 3) the feasibility of 
implementing the policy.  
The paper utilizes the World Economic Forum Border Administration indicators 
to assess impacts on the overall efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. import procedures 
(the first evaluation criterion). These trade facilitation indicators are not only the most 
inclusive (covering most of the indicators used by the other organizations) but focus 
specifically on the import-related activities at the border where the United States ranks 
below global leaders, suggesting that there is ample opportunity for improvements. 
Additionally, the Border Administration indicators measure the effectiveness of activities 
where DHS influence could effect change, to include the clearance process at the border, 
the time and cost required to import goods into a specific nation, the number of 
documents required for import, and the efficiency of relevant customs administrations.  
To assess the impact of each policy option on U.S. businesses (the second 
evaluation criterion), this paper reviews recent recommendations from the Commercial 
Operations Advisory Committee (COAC), CBP’s primary private-sector advisory group. 
The formal, publicly available recommendations offered by the COAC provide helpful 
insight into the challenges encountered by large and small American businesses across a 
variety of industry sectors. The author uses key words to identify and categorize the 
subset of COAC recommendations focused on trade facilitation activities and then 
employs a simple binary scoring system of “yes” or “no” to assess if the proposed policy 
options would address the recommendation. 
Finally, this paper assesses the feasibility of implementing each of the policy 
options (the third evaluation criterion). For this purpose, the author utilizes a scatter chart 
to distinguish between possible “quick-wins” that can be accomplished within the 
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existing DHS mission and/or authorities and budget and “longer-term solutions” that 
would require mission expansion, and additional authorities and funding.18 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The goal of this research is two-fold: first, to assess the impact that closer 
integration of the United States’ security and economic security priorities may have on 
the homeland security enterprise, and second, to consider potential roles DHS should play 
in this space. An initial review suggested two categories of relevant literature, to include: 
• Sources that contextualize the relationship between security and 
economics over time and, in theory, that provide insight into opportunities 
to advance the contemporary strategic security and economic agendas of 
the United States. 
• Sources devoted to the specific topic of trade facilitation, including 
discussions of the concept, qualitative assessments of various 
implementation approaches, and globally recognized performance 
measurements and indicators that can guide DHS activities.  
1. Relationship between National Security and Economic Priorities 
The large and diverse body of literature focused on the relationship between 
security and economics suggests an enduring interest in the topic, ranging back to the two 
World Wars and the Cold War through the advent of globalization. These sources, mainly 
historical reviews or assessments of different perspectives on the security–economy 
dynamic, provide a helpful contextual backdrop for the central research question. The 
only consistency among the sources reviewed was their agreement that security and 
economic factors share some degree of interdependence, and that a clear division exists 
between what may be termed the “realist” and “liberal” schools of thought. In their article 
“Paying for Security: The Security Prosperity Dilemma in the United States,” Uk Heo 
and Robert Eger characterize the key differences between these schools of thought—
those who insist upon clear lines of demarcation between national security and economic 
                                                 
18 See Appendix Figure 13, “Criterion 3: Feasibility of Implementation.” 
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agendas and factors (the realists) and those who take the opposite view by suggesting a 
necessary inter-relationship between the two (the liberalist perspective).19  
Heo and Eger, representing a realist perspective, argue that military force remains 
the most effective means of advancing foreign policy goals despite the fact that the costs 
associated with such power hinder economic growth. Their argument echoes the case 
made earlier by R. Cohen and P.A. Wilson that superpower nations would experience 
ever-increasing difficulty in developing expensive next-generation technologies and 
processes to secure their homeland over the longer term without sacrificing near-term 
economy prosperity.20 Others associated with the “realist” school of international 
relations (and economic thought) agree that power is the dominant factor in world politics 
as self-interested, rational state actors work to achieve security through the accumulation 
of wealth and force. Because this power must be derived at the expense of others, 
however, violent conflict will inevitably arise. Some of the classic works in this school of 
thought include Thucydide’s The Peloponnesian War and Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan.21 
More recently, the realist perspectives have been more thoroughly developed by Hans 
Morgenthau, who, in Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
defined international politics “as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart 
from other spheres, such as economics, ethics, aesthetics, or religion”; neo-realist 
Kenneth Waltz; George Kennan, father of the containment strategy against the former 
Soviet Union; and Edward Hallett Carr, who, echoing Hobbes, argued in The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis that not only economic issues but even morality itself existed only as a 
                                                 
19 Uk Heo and Robert Eger, “Paying for Security: The Security-Prosperity Dilemma in the United 
States,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 5 (2005): 792–817; another helpful overview of the different 
camps on this issue is Robert Tollison and Thomas Willett, “Power, Politics, and Prosperity: Alternative 
Views of Economic Interdependence,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
460 (March1982): 21–28. 
20 R. Cohen and P. A. Wilson, “Superpowers in Decline? Economic Performance and National 
Security,” Comparative Strategy 7, no. 2 (1988): 99–132. 
21 Thucycides, The Peloponnesian War, translated by Steven Lattimore (Indianapolis, IL: Hackett, 
1998); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall 
and Civill, ed. Ian Shapiro (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). 
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product of the dominant social order and “the search for an ethical norm outside of 
politics is doomed to frustration.”22 
In contrast, Giacomo Luciani provides insight into the alternative liberal 
perspective in its discussion of the means by which economic factors can and should be 
used to advance a nation’s security agenda. In “The Economic Content of Security,” 
Luciani brings modern United Nations policies to bear in support of his case that 
national, regional, and even global security priorities have the potential to drive economic 
prosperity at each of these levels.23 Experts in this school of thought, ranging back to the 
founders of classical liberalism such as Immanuel Kant, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, argue that individuals and states are motivated by a multiplicity of factors and 
interests (to include historical, cultural, emotional, and social) and are, therefore, too 
complex to allow linear predictions of behavior or outcomes. According to this view, 
security is not obtained through the application of power but through cooperation and 
development of mutually advantageous associations. Joseph Nye and Robert Keophane, 
in their seminal work initially published in 1977, advanced the theory that the web of 
“complex interdependencies” binds a nation’s security and economic agendas together, 
along with economies among sovereign states, in today’s connected world.24 This fused 
association resulted in a blurring of lines between domestic and foreign policy 
considerations, rendered violent conflict a less viable policy tool, and elevated the status 
of economic policies as effective instruments of advancing national objectives.25  
                                                 
22 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edition (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1985); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland 
Press, 1979); George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947; Edward Carr, 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to Study International Relations (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001), 19. 
23 Giacomo Luciani, “The Economic Content of Security,” Journal of Public Policy 8, no. 2 (April 
1988): 151–173. 
24 Robert O. Keophane and Joseph S. Nye, Power & Interdependence, 2nd edition (Glenview, IL: 
Harper Collins, 1990).  
25 Other important works that provide additional insight into the liberal perspective include Micheal 
Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (December 1986): 
1151–1169; Michael Barnett and Martha Finnermore, Rules for the World: International Consequences of 
Economic Growth (New York: Knopf, 2005); and a number of works by economist John K. Galbraith. 
Stephen Pressman provides a helpful overview of the scores of Galbraith’s articles and books in “The 
Economic Contributions of John Kenneth Galbraith,” Review of Political Economy 17, no. 2: 161–209.  
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2. Trade Facilitation  
A third category of relevant sources includes theoretical works geared toward 
policy-makers that explore the concept of trade facilitation, practical “how-to” guides for 
economies interested in implementing specific trade facilitation improvements, and 
reports promulgated by recognized global organizations that rely on economic analysis 
and survey data to rank national performance according to established indicators.  
In his policy piece entitled “Trade Facilitation as a Growth Tool,” Edward 
Gresser conveys a perspective common among these sources: namely, that a program of 
simplification, harmonization, and modernization of government rules, processes, and 
requirements has the potential to dramatically improve a nation’s security and economic 
competitiveness.26 Andrew Grainger, an expert on supply chain management and 
logistics, shares this perspective and offers further analysis of trade facilitation 
frameworks. In a series of 2011 articles, “Trade Facilitation: A Conceptual Review,” and 
“Developing the Case for Trade Facilitation in Practice,” Grainger outlines the 
characteristics of typical trade facilitation theories and offers a strategic-level assessment 
of the fiscal, legal, and institutional factors that can speed, or hinder, implementation.27 
Evdokia Moise’s seminal paper entitled “The Cost of Introducing and Implementing 
Trade Facilitation Measures” exemplifies a wide array of sources that not only explore 
the concept of trade facilitation but offer quantitative assessments of potential benefits to 
both private and public-sector stakeholders.28 These works, which typically use data 
modeling techniques to conduct macroeconomic assessments of the impact of trade 
                                                 
26 Edward Gresser, “Trade Facilitation as a Growth Tool,” Progressive Economy, July 17, 2013, 
http://www.progressive-economy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/trade.facilitation.pdf.  
27 Andrew Grainger, “Trade Facilitation: A Conceptual Review,” Journal of World Trade, 45 no. 1 
(February 2011) 39–62; Andrew Grainger, “Developing the Case for Trade Facilitation in Practice,” World 
Customs Journal 5, no. 2 (September 2011) 65–76.  
28 Evdokia Moise, “The Costs of Introducing and Implementing Trade Facilitation Measures,” in 
Overcoming Border Bottlenecks: The Costs and Benefits of Trade Facilitation, 173–217 (Paris: OECD, 
2009), doi: 10.1787/9789264056954-en. Other influential works of this type include: John Wilson, 
Catherine Mann, and Tsunehiro Otsuki, “Trade Facilitation and Economic Development: A New Approach 
to Quantifying the Impact,” World Bank Economic Review 17, no. 3 (2003): 367–389; Gerard McLinden et 
al., Border Management Modernization (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 2011); Evdokia Moise and Silvia Sorescu, Contribution of Trade Facilitation Measures to 
the Operation of Supply Chains (OECD Trade Policy Papers no. 181) (Paris: OECD, 2015).  
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facilitation policies on global and regional economies, are valuable decision-making tools 
for reform-minded policy-makers.  
Another set of trade facilitation sources provide practical guidance on how to 
build or develop discrete components of a trade facilitation program. Rather than 
explaining concepts and quantifying benefits for policy-makers, these works offer 
technical, task-oriented information geared toward more operational audiences. Examples 
of these works, typically promulgated by recognized global institutions, include the 
World Bank’s Trade and Transport Facilitation: A Practical Toolkit for Implementation, 
a step-by-step “how-to” guide called Trade Facilitation and the Single Window issued by 
the United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT), 
and similar compendiums published by the World Customs Organization such as How to 
Build a Single Window Environment, Guide to Measuring the Time Required for the 
Release of Goods, and dozens of non-binding “recommendations” related to trade 
facilitation and coordinated border management.29 
The final group of sources in the trade facilitation category include those 
particularly relevant to this paper’s evaluation of different trade policy options that may 
inform DHS’s efforts to better define its role in supporting national economic 
competitiveness. These sources include a series of annual reports promulgated by 
recognized organizations such as the World Economic Forum, World Bank, and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) within the United 
Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business. The reports issued by 
these organizations contain helpful quantitative data and economic indicators drawn from 
publically available commercial sources, survey information, and modeling analysis of 
regional and global trade flows. The data and economic indicators serve as helpful 
benchmarks against which to understand the United States’ ranking as compared to other 
                                                 
29 The World Bank, Trade and Transport Facilitation Assessment: A Practical Toolkit for Country 
Implementation (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/ 
10986/2490; United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT), Trade 
Facilitation and the Single Window (Geneva: United Nations, 2011); World Customs Organization, How to 
Build a Single Window Environment (Brussels: World Customs Organization, 2011); World Customs 
Organization, Guide to Measure the Time Required for the Release of Goods, Version 2 (Brussels: World 
Customs Organization, 2011); UN/CEFACT, Recommendation No. 33: Recommendation and Guidelines 
on Establishing a Single Window (Geneva: United Nations, 2005).  
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nations and highlight areas for improvement. Because these reports are issued annually or 
biannually, the data and indicators are most helpful for raising awareness and helping 
policy-makers assess the impact of completed, ongoing, and future trade modernization 
activities. The specific works from these organizations that most significantly inform this 
paper include: 
• The Global Enabling Trade Report, issued every other year by the World 
Economic Forum since 2008, uses an enabling trade index (ETI) of fifty-
six total indicators subdivided across seven “pillars” to assess the trade 
facilitation scores of 138 economies. The data to assess a nation’s 
performance for each of the indicators are drawn from the proprietary 
databases of participating organizations as well as from results of an 
annual survey involving approximately 13,000 respondents from 148 
economies.30 
• The “Trade Facilitation Indicators” interactive online tool, developed and 
updated annually by OECD, assesses the progress made by 163 countries 
in implementing ninety specific indicators grouped into eleven major 
categories.31 The data are derived from quantitative measures of border 
processes valued on a scale of 0 to 2, with 2 indicating best performance.  
The World Bank’s Connecting to Compete: Trade Logistics in the Global 
Economy report, published every other year since 2014, relies on comprehensive survey 
results to assess the supply chain efficiency of 160 countries according to sixty-five 
“logistics performance indicators.”32 The data are both qualitative and quantitative, being 
derived from surveys of logistics operators around the world and analysis of publicly 
available commercial information. 
  
                                                 
30 Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz, Thierry Geiger, and Sean Doherty, The Global Enabling Trade Report 
2014 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2014), 6. Other participating organizations include International 
Trade Centre, the Global Express Association, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.  
31 “About the OECD trade facilitation indicators,” accessed December 23, 2015, 
http://www.oecd.org/trade/facilitation/indicators.htm#About-TFI. Note that the number of countries 
covered by the OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators has grown from twenty-six countries in 2011 to 163 in 
2015. The number of indicators has remained more static, shifting from twelve to eveln during that same 
timeframe.  
32 The World Bank, Connecting to Compete: Trade Logistics in the Global Economy (Washington, 
DC: The World Bank, 2016). 
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II. SAYING BUT NOT DOING: CONTRASTING OPERATIONAL 
REALITIES IN THE MODERN TRADE ENVIRONMENT AND DHS 
POLICY OBJECTIVES 
A. THE MODERN TRADE ENVIRONMENT 
The United States and nations around the world have experienced an exponential 
growth in trade over the last several decades as a result of globalization, advances in 
information manufacturing and communication technology, and improved efficiencies in 
logistics and transportation networks.33 As mentioned previously, the United States is the 
world’s second-largest trading nation, importing approximately $2.7 trillion and 
exporting $2.2 trillion worth of goods and services in 2016.34 In addition to providing 
Americans with a seemingly endless array of commodities (affordable garments, 
agricultural products from every corner of the world, pharmaceuticals, and electronics, 
for example), energy imports and other raw materials keep our electric grids powered and 
our businesses running. The tens of billions of dollars collected annually in duties, tariffs, 
and other fees levied on these imports and exports also represent an important source of 
revenue for the U.S. government.  
1. The Evolving Trade Environment  
In addition to increasing the speed and volume of international commerce, 
advances arising from globalization have enabled a decentralization of the production of 
goods that has transformed the trading environment and raised some tough questions 
about the continued relevance of U.S. government trade and border security policies and 
processes. Although the impacts of globalization and the United States’ future 
relationship with it currently are the topic of much political debate, its characteristics over 
the last several decades are clear. These characteristics, which include the availability of 
                                                 
33 For general works on the impacts of globalization on trade, see David Hummels, “Transportation 
Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of Globalization,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, 
no. 3 (2007): 131–154; Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Yukio Kawano, and Benjamin D. Brewer, “Trade 
Globalization since 1795: Waves of Integration in the World-System,” American Sociological Review 
(2000): 77–95. 
34 “Annual Trade Highlights: 2016 Press Highlights,” Department of Commerce, last modified 
November 17, 2016, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/annual.html. 
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faster transportation options, cheaper labor markets, improved access to information, and 
reduced national tariffs through a general trend toward trade liberalization policies, have 
allowed businesses to find competitive advantages in diverse locations. While some 
goods are still manufactured and consumed in the same country or are finished in one 
country and shipped to another for consumption, today the dominant trade model for 
large businesses is one in which the phases of production are spread around the world and 
no longer tied by proximity to the end consumer. Rather, an array of intermediate goods 
and components move quickly and cheaply across national jurisdictions and utilize 
preferred routes during different phases of the production process. The rise of “value 
chains” (so called because of the value added to a particular good as it is constructed 
during its movement through the supply chain) complicates traditional import and export 
reporting mechanisms; an overall increase in trade volumes no longer correlates to trade 
production or output.35 This is because an intermediate part or component may cross 
international borders and be registered by customs authorities as an import or export 
many times before it becomes a final product. A recent report from the World Economic 
Forum found that intermediate commodities now constitute more than 50 percent of 
goods imported by the thirty-four OECD economies, an appreciable increase over 
previous years.36 The OECD statistic aligns with the United States’ importation of 
intermediate products, which in 2015 accounted for approximately 52 percent of total 
imports.37 
                                                 
35 For more general discussion on the growing trend of global trade in intermediate products, see 
Richard Baldwin, “Global Manufacturing Value Chains and Trade Rules,” in The Shifting Geography of 
Global Value Chains: Implications for Developing Countries and Trade Policy (Geneva: World Economic 
Forum, 2012), 16; Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey, and Timothy Sturgeon. “The Governance of Global 
Value Chains,” Review of International Political Economy 12, no. 1 (2005): 78–104. 
36 Peter Draper et al., The Shifting Geography of Global Value Chains: Implications for Developing 
Countries and Trade Policy (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2012), 4; OECD is the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, and includes thirty-four member countries representing 
developed as well as emerging economies. 
37 United States Census Bureau, “Exhibit 10: Real U.S. Trade in Goods by Principal End-Use 
Category Chained (2009) Dollars,” in U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services (FT900), last 
modified November 17, 2016, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/ 
index.html. The 52 percent figure represents the addition of the capital goods (30 percent) such as 
machinery, equipment, parts, and industrial supplies (22 percent) such as lumber, plastics, fuel, and steel in 
CY 2015.  
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Some economists argue that the traditional definition of intermediate goods 
should actually be expanded to include automotive parts and even food, as these products 
“are inputs into the production of the producers in America.”38 For example, economist 
Don Boudreaux points out that products imported by large companies (like Wal-Mart) 
and then sold on to end consumers could very well be categorized as intermediate 
components as “they are inputs into Wal-Mart’s production process.”39  
So when Wal-Mart imports packaged bed linen, it does not buy these 
goods as consumer goods; it buys them as intermediate goods—goods that 
are used by Wal-Mart as inputs into producing the final consumer service 
that we might call “shopping convenience.” Only by supplying this latter 
service—shopping convenience—does Wal-Mart earn profits. From Wal-
Mart’s perspective, imports from China of packaged bed linen are inputs 
used to produce its own output no less so than are Wal-Mart’s delivery 
trucks, warehouses, cash registers, advertising, and corporate stationery.40 
Under such a broader definition, the United States’ importation of intermediate products 
in 2015 would increase considerably, to nearly 95 percent.. Regardless, the demonstrated 
rise in value chains and associated intermediate commodity phenomenon that 
characterize today’s trade environment both indicate that increased trade costs could 
increase the costs of domestic production and consumption and undermine the nation’s 
economic health. A trade cost, as defined by a 2004 study and accepted in relevant 
literature, is “all costs incurred in getting a good to a final user other than the marginal 
costs of producing the good itself.”41 Activities encompassed by this general term include 
transportation, distribution, and information costs, as well as legal and policy 
requirements, including tariffs.42  
Most relevant to this discussion are the subset of legal and policy requirements, 
exclusive of tariffs, that government regulators take at the border and which can impact 
                                                 
38 Don Boudreaux, “Almost All Imports Are Inputs,” Café Hayek, August 1, 2016, http://café 
hayek.com/2016/08/almost-all-imports-are-inputs.html. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid.  
41 James E. Anderson and Eric van Wincoop, “Trade Costs,” Journal of Economic Literature 42, no. 3 
(September 2004): 691. 
42 Ibid., 692.  
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trade flows. As global ad valorem tariffs (rates established “according to the value” of the 
good) have plummeted since the establishment of the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs in 1947 (from approximately 40 to 4 percent), policy-makers increasingly look to 
non-tariff measures for opportunities to reduce costs.43 Whereas tariffs are “obvious, 
directly observable, and unambiguously intended to affect trade,” defining and 
understanding the impact of non-tariff measures on trade is, as one observer put it, “still 
very much a fuzzy science.”44 At the most general level, non-tariff measures are 
legitimate government controls imposed to protect domestic consumers, markets, 
businesses, and the environment, but that may have the unintended consequence of 
increasing the cost of exporting and importing.45 Relevant international organizations 
(such as the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Conference on Trade 
Development, the International Trade Commission, and others), offer varying 
classifications of non-tariff barriers. For consistency, this paper relies on the general 
classifications provided by the World Trade Organization’s online Integrated Trade 
Intelligence Portal (Table 1) and focuses later discussion most heavily on the measures 
impacting imports, as these are the activities in which DHS contributes to policy 
development and/or enforcement of laws or regulations at the border.46 
                                                 
43 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was the early multilateral trade agreement that 
governed global trade liberalization efforts until its replacement with the World Trade Organization in 
1994. For more information on international trade governance bodies and rules, see Meredith A. Crowley, 
“An Introduction to the WTO and GATT,” Economic Perspectives 4 (2003): 42–57.  
Robert W. Staiger, “The Economics of GATT,” National Bureau of Economic Research, accessed 
February 1, 2017, http://www.nber.org/reporter/spring99/staiger.html. 
44 Olivier Cadot, Maryla Maliszewska, and Sebastian Saez, “Non-tariff Measures: Impact, Regulation, 
and Trade Facilitation,” Border Management Modernization (November 2010): 215. 
45 The term nontariff measures is often synonymous with nontariff barriers, although the latter can 
have a more negative connotation as it traditionally refers to overtly protectionist policies. This is a 
distinction between nontariff measures, which tend to be policies that protect or promote American 
businesses and markets and may as a result impact foreign traders, but were not specifically designed with 
that end in mind. One economist helpfully categorizes the variety of non-tariff measures/barriers as 
protectionist policies, assistance policies, and non-protectionist policies. Alan Deardorff, “Easing the 
Burden of Non-tariff Barriers,” International Trade Center, October 1, 2012, http://www.tradeforum.org/ 
article/Easing-the-burden-of-non-tariff-barriers/.  
46 The World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2012: A Closer Look at Non-tariff Measures in 
the 21st century (Geneva: The World Trade Organization, 2012), 94, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/ 
booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report12_e.pdf.  
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Measures Affecting Production 
& Trade 
Customs procedures 
(delays/corruption) Government Procedures Regulatory framework 
Charges and taxes on imports Charges and taxes on exports Technical barriers to trade 
Customs valuation Export restrictions Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
Pre-shipment inspection Export subsidies Intellectual property rights 
Rules of origin Export promotion  
Import prohibitions (quotas, 
licensing) Special economic zones  
Anti-dumping, countervailing 
duties, safeguard regimes   
Government procurement   
State trading enterprises   
 
While the Trump administration’s skepticism of the advantages of globalization 
for certain domestic industries could occasion a renewed consideration of tariffs, trade 
facilitation efforts will nonetheless remain a priority for businesses large and small whose 
bottom lines are impacted negatively by inefficiencies and other frictions at the border. 
2. Post-9/11 Security Measures 
Another hallmark feature of the new commercial environment is what supply 
chain management expert Andrew Grainger has accurately described as “the avalanche” 
of supply chain and transportation security requirements developed after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.48 With commerce arriving daily at the Nation’s 329 
official ports of entry, concern after 9/11 rose among experts and legislators alike that the 
supply chain system that transported critical trade was equally as capable of transporting 
weapons of mass destruction or other dangerous and illicit goods that could harm the 
                                                 
47 Adapted from “Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal,” World Trade Organization, accessed June 17, 
2017, http://i-tip.wto.org/goods/Forms/GraphView.aspx?period=y&scale=lg. 
48 Andrew Grainger, “Supply Chain Security: Adding to a Complex Operational and Institutional 
Environment,” World Customs Journal 1, no. 2 (2007): 17–29. 
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nation or disrupt the smooth functioning of the system. The concern among security 
experts and legislators alike was that, prior to 9/11, “America’s terrestrial and maritime 
front doors were wide open.”49 Recommendations in the 9/11 Commission Report and 
growing political pressures for increased security of open supply chain systems and 
transportation networks contributed to a spate of new laws, regulations, and programs 
geared toward mitigating real and perceived vulnerabilities throughout the nation’s 
domestic transportation system and other critical infrastructure sectors, as well as the 
global supply chains that fed them.50  
In addition to the specter of terrorist threats to the global supply chain, the system 
is also vulnerable to other manmade threats (such as organized criminal groups) and 
natural disasters. In one recent survey, 97 percent of American retailers indicated that 
they had experienced inventory loss through cargo theft and other criminal activities, 
with over half of the respondents reporting “a significant increase” in such activity in 
recent years.51 The financial impact of such organized criminal supply chain theft is 
consequential, estimated to be approximately $10 billion a year in the United States 
alone.52 More recently, system-wide supply chain disruptions triggered by relatively 
localized events (such the loss of key electronic and automotive manufacturing facilities 
in Japan during the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, disruptions to air cargo during the 2012 
volcanic eruption in Iceland, and energy shortages stemming from a number of domestic 
                                                 
49 Steven Flynn, “America the Vulnerable,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (2002): 60–74. 
50 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States of America, 9/11 Commission 
Report, 390. Key legislation that established scores of new import, export, supply chain, and transportation 
security-related requirements include: the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), the Trade Act of 
2002 (P.L. 107-210), the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295), the Coast Guard 
and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-293), the Security and Accountability for Every 
(SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347), and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). The literature of specific border and supply chain security programs that have 
been developed in the aftermath of 9/11 is well established, with dozens of congressional hearings on the 
topic with testimony from both private- and public-sector witnesses, numerous reports from the 
Government Accountability Office, and scholarly articles such as Andrew Grainger, “Customs and Trade 
Facilitation: From Concepts to Implementation,” World Customs Journal 2, no. 1 (2008): 17–30; and 
Grainger, “Trade Facilitation.” 
51 National Retail Federation, Organized Retail Crime Survey: 2015 (Washington, DC: National 
Retail Federation, 2015), 6.  
52 Daniel Ekwall, “Supply Chain Security: Threats and Solutions,” in Risk Management: Current 
Issues and Challenges, ed. Nerija Banaitiene (Rijeka, Croatia: InTech, 2012). 
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weather events to include Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy) initiated an ongoing global 
conversation focused on how best to build a trade system capable of absorbing shocks 
and recovering rapidly from disturbance events.53  
These new requirements and considerations have contributed to an increased 
vigilance at the nation’s borders and closer scrutiny of the goods transiting our border 
each day. However, these measures also have increased the cost of doing business with 
the United States and, if unchecked, could impede economic prosperity in the years to 
come. The literature on the fiscal impact of the 9/11 attacks is extensive. One report from 
the International Monetary Fund estimated higher security costs for industries engaged in 
global trade at“$1.6 billion per year and, because of slower processing times at the border 
and reduced consistency, additional costs of carrying 10 percent higher inventories at 
$7.5 billion per year.54 Another assessment conducted by a consortium of economists 
estimated $65 billion in costs incurred by industry stakeholders as a result of necessary 
changes to logistics supply chains in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.55  
Although industry stakeholders largely acknowledged the need for a strengthened 
security posture after 9/11, their concern grew in proportion to the increase in federal 
programs and requirements. Data compiled by the American Association of Exporters 
and Importers (AAEI) helps to illustrate this point. Posted initially on their website in 
2010, AAEI’s “Post 9/11 Homeland Security Programs” chart identified thirty-five new 
security programs established in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks. Of 
these new programs, twenty-two were mandatory, twelve were assessed as causing 
supply chain delays of less than twenty-four hours, five as causing “major” delays of 
                                                 
53 Some of the most recent or relevant work on supply chain resilience includes: Xiao-Feng Shao,. 
“Demand-side Reactive Strategies for Supply Disruptions in a Multiple-product System,” International 
Journal of Production Economics 136, no. 1 (2012): 241–252; Walid Klibi and Alain Martel, “Modeling 
Approaches for the Design of Resilient Supply Networks under Disruptions,” International Journal of 
Production Economics135, no. 2 (2012): 882–898; Yossi Sheffi, The Resilient Enterprise: Overcoming 
Vulnerability for Competitive Advantage (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); Philip Palin, “Supply Chain 
Resilience: Diversity+ Self-organization= Adaptation,” Homeland Security Affairs XIII (August 2013). 
54 “World Economic Outlook: The Global Economy After September 11,” International Monetary 
Fund, accessed June 17, 2017, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2001/03/.  
55 Bernasek, “Friction Economy.” The changes addressed increased transportation costs, the need to 
maintain additional inventory because of longer clearance times at the border, and costs needed to comply 
with new security requirements associated with importing goods.  
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twenty-four to forty-eight hours, fifteen as requiring additional resources from businesses 
to implement, and nine as increasing the times associated with the transport of goods 
throughout the supply chain system.56 The underlying point AAEI sought to convey with 
the chart is that the United States’ economic competitiveness can be impacted negatively 
by bureaucratic control regimes that had been established to address security concerns but 
that, left unchecked, can become complex and byzantine processes that place a heavy 
burden of compliance on companies looking to do business with or in the United States. 
Data provided by the World Economic Forum suggests that the concerns expressed by 
AAEI and other private-sector stakeholders are not unfounded. The Forum reported in the 
2010 version of their biannual Enabling Trade Report that “the threat of terrorism to 
business [in the United States] remains among the costliest in the world.”57 The nation’s 
ranking has only fallen since then, from 114th in 2010 to 118th in 2014.58 
B. THE CONCEPT OF TRADE FACILITATION 
Government regulators, businesses, and trade and supply chain experts alike are 
coming to understand that decentralized and uncoordinated government controls and a 
legal and regulatory environment constructed hodgepodge over decades has resulted in 
layers of importing requirements that are costly and time consuming for businesses to 
implement. Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, two economists from the Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, explain this phenomenon in their influential 2013 report 
quantifying potential global payoffs of a restructured global trade agenda and 
requirements regime. “It’s not that opportunities are lacking,” they note, as “credible 
econometric research shows that global trade densities are less than a third of their 
potential; moreover, when measured in tariff-equivalent terms, the ‘border effect’ of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers approaches 100 percent. The problem is that responsible policy 
                                                 
56 “The American Trader’s Guide to Post 9/11 Homeland Security Programs,” American Association 
of Exporters and Importers, accessed September 19, 2013, http://www.aaei.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket= 
voD5U22%2bcqQ%3d&tabid=79.  
57 Robert Z. Lawrence et al., The Global Enabling Trade Report 2010 (Geneva: World Economic 
Forum, 2010), 24, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalEnablingTrade_Report_2010.pdf.  
58 Ibid., 313. 
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officials are not rising to the challenge by energetically dismantling barriers that impede 
trade and investment flows.”59 
Other experts agree that policies and procedures better suited to the modern 
commercial environment are needed to ensure efficient and cost-effective cross-border 
trade. For example, as the contributors to the World Economic Forum’s compendium on 
The Shifting Geography of Global Value Chains explained in the recommendations 
section: 
These dynamics [increases in value chains and new models of trade] will 
drive unilateral trade policy responses centered on promoting 
competitiveness, efficiency, and attractiveness to value chain investments. 
Related to this, the international rules governing value chain operations 
need to be revisited with a view to updating them so that the new 
emerging context can evolve optimally.60  
The growing apprehension about the inadequacy of current policies and 
institutions relative to the needs of modern trade has encouraged exploration of new 
frameworks and organizational models related to the governance of global commerce. 
The concept of trade facilitation is one salient example. Concrete definitions of trade 
facilitation have not yet crystalized, but general themes are arising as multiple 
international organizations focus on the issue.61 The OECD defines trade facilitation as 
“efforts to simplify and streamline international trade procedures to allow for the easier 
flow of legitimate goods across international boundaries and thereby to reduce the costs 
of trade.”62 According to UN/CEFACT, trade facilitation is the “simplification, 
harmonization and standardization of the procedures and associated information flows 
required to move goods and provide related services from seller to buyer and to make 
                                                 
59 Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, Payoff from the World Trade Agenda 2013 (Washington, DC: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2013), 66, Table 2.3.  
60 Draper et al., The Shifting Geography of Global Value Chains, 4.  
61 John Wilson, Catherine Mann, and Tsunehiro Otsuki note that “there is no standard definition of 
trade facilitation in public policy discourse” in their article, “Assessing the Benefits of Trade Facilitation: A 
Global Perspective,” The World Economy 28. no. 6 (2005): 842. 
62 Vivian C. Jones and Lisa Seghetti, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, 
Enforcement, and Security (CRS Report No. R43014) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2015), 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43014.pdf.  
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payments.”63 Recent U.S. legislation on the topic defined the term through the lens of the 
role played by CBP in coordinating related activities at the border, noting that trade 
facilitation “refers to policies and activities of U.S. Customs and Border Protection with 
respect to facilitating the movement of merchandise into and out of the United States in a 
manner that complies with the customs and trade laws of the United States.”64 This paper 
rlies on the definition provided by the World Trade Organization, an acknowledged 
authority on the issue. In its recent trade facilitation agreement, the World Trade 
Organization defines the term simply as “expediting the movement, release, and 
clearance of goods.”65  
Analysis by the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the OECD, the 
World Economic Forum and other relevant institutions has established the economic 
benefits of improved trade facilitation. According to the World Economic Forum, 
worldwide improvement of trade facilitation measures “even halfway to the world’s best 
practices” could increase the global gross domestic product (GDP) six times more than 
removing all tariffs.66 Put another way, the reduction of these barriers could “increase 
global GDP by nearly 5% and trade by 15% whereas complete elimination of all tariffs 
would increase global GDP by only (0.7%).”67  
This translates into an addition of 2.8 percent to the United States’ GDP and $200 
billion to U.S. exports.68 Other quantitative studies have assessed the impact of all the 
measures included in the World Trade Organization’s trade facilitation agreement, 
                                                 
63 UN/CEFACT, Recommendation No. 4: National Trade Facilitation Bodies (Geneva: United 
Nations, 2015), 5. 
64 Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act, P.L. 114-125 Section. 2 (February 24, 2016). 
65 World Trade Organization, “Agreement on Trade Facilitation,” 1.  
66 World Economic Forum, Enabling Trade: Valuing Growth Opportunities (Geneva: World 
Economic Forum, 2013), 4, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_SCT_EnablingTrade_Report_2013.pdf. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Gresser, “Trade Facilitation as a Growth Tool.”  
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estimating that they “have the potential to reduce overall trade costs by almost 10%.”69 
As World Trade Organization Director General Roberto Azevêdo explained in a 
December 2015 speech, improved trade facilitation is simply good for business:  
The private sector is well aware of the problems caused by high costs and 
long delays at the border—and the barriers to trade that they represent. 
These barriers can often mean the difference between being able to 
compete internationally—or not. The Trade Facilitation Agreement aims 
to lower, or remove, these barriers. The Agreement is essentially about 
streamlining and simplifying customs procedures to cut the cost of doing 
business across borders.70  
Recognizing the opportunities associated with enhanced trade facilitation, private-
sector stakeholders consistently raise the issue in engagements with the U.S. government. 
Most relevant to this paper include the efforts of the chartered industry advisory groups 
that provide formal feedback and recommendations to DHS and other government 
agencies and international organizations with similar trade-related responsibilities. Key 
examples of these private-sector bodies include the Commercial Operations Advisory 
Committee, the Advisory Committee on Supply Chain Competitiveness, and the World 
Custom Organization’s Private Sector Consultative Group.71 As each of these industry 
groups includes a diverse array of businesses (including importers, brokers, carriers, 
retailers, and others involved in the supply chain processes) and associations representing 
a wide range of interests; their feedback reflects a variety of priorities and interests. In 
                                                 
69 WTO members concluded negotiations on the Trade Facilitation Agreement text in December 2013 
and the agreement subsequently went into force on February 22, 2017. The agreement includes provisions 
for improving cooperation among customs agencies, removing procedural, regulatory, or technical barriers 
to trade, and enhancing global trade facilitation and trade enforcement capacity. Evdokia Moise, Peter 
Minor, and Thomas Orliac, Trade Facilitation Indicators: The Impact on Trade Costs (Paris: OECD, 
2011). 
70 Roberto Azevêdo, “WTO Trade Facilitation in Action—Launch of Global Alliance for Trade 
Facilitation: Speech by Director-General Roberto Azevêdo,” World Trade Organization, December 17, 
2015, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra106_e.htm. 
71 The Commercial Operations Advisory Committee was established in 1987 by the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (Pub. L. No. 100-203). The members, appointed by the Departments of Treasury and 
Homeland Security, advise those departments on a range of customs compliance and trade facilitation 
issues. The Advisory Committee on Supply Chain Competitiveness is another formal advisory body 
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transportation, infrastructure, and supply chain issues. Finally, the Private Sector Consultative Group, 
established in 2006, includes representatives from thirty businesses and advises the World Customs 
Organization on a variety of global trade and customs issues.  
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fact, the very diversity of these groups serves as a check against biased recommendations 
that might give one entity and advantage over another. The publicly available 
recommendations coming out of these industry advisory groups highlight their priority 
concerns and provide helpful insight into those areas where U.S. government activities, 
particularly those of DHS, can best be targeted to improve U.S. economic 
competitiveness.  
Feedback from these private-sector groups contributes to the growing realization 
among policy-makers that current federal policy frameworks and institutions require a 
recalibration to realize fully the benefits of international commerce in the new trade 
environment. For example, out of the 281 formal recommendations offered to DHS by 
the Commercial Operations Advisory Committee between 2013 and 2015, nearly half (47 
percent) proposed methods by which DHS could remove impediments to the importing 
process at the border through increased automation, partnerships, and transparency and 
improved integration of processes with other government agencies.72  
Another formal industry group, the Advisory Committee on Supply Chain 
Competitiveness, also emphasized its concerns over increased border frictions in the 
feedback it has provided to-date to the Department of Commerce. Although this group 
focuses primarily on export and domestic freight policy, as well as domestic 
infrastructure investments (which are outside the scope of this paper), it is notable that six 
of the thirty recommendations developed since late 2012 related to the policy, 
technology, and program integration and modernization necessary to “ensure efficient 
trade flows between the United States and its international trade partners.”73  
Private-sector stakeholders worldwide echo these concerns. In their annual reports 
to the World Customs Organization Policy Commission, the Private Sector Consultative 
                                                 
72 “FY 2013–2015 COAC Recommendations,” CBP, accessed June 17, 2017, 
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73 A complete listing of recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Supply Chain 
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Group has offered a host of recommendations about how governments can maintain high 
security standards at their borders without unduly hindering the flow of trade. Of 
particular relevance to this discussion is the Private Sector Consultative Group’s 2013 
WCO Orientation Package for Decision Makers, which “provides a response to the 
question of what business wants from Customs.”74 The group’s priorities, what they 
“want” from government controllers, includes transparency (through regular 
communication and clear guidance), predictability (through consistent policy and activity 
among all government stakeholders), and efficiency (through integration, modernization, 
and simplification of policy, regulation, programs, and technology).  
Importantly, the benefits of effectively implemented trade facilitation activities 
can extend well beyond the private sector. Public-sector entities, such as government 
regulators, also can realize reduced administrative costs and improved performance of 
their enforcement and compliance missions from cutting red tape and streamlining 
requirements associated with processing imports and exports. Trade facilitation activities 
tend to focus on speeding the movement of commerce and, therefore, could reduce the 
time available to government regulators to perform their enforcement functions. 
However, these negative consequences can be diminished by the application of new 
processes and capabilities better suited to today’s fast-paced supply chains. For example, 
customs modernization efforts within the United States for more than a decade have 
resulted in the reduction of paper documentation and manual processes needed to process 
imports and exports.75 The transition to electronic data submission and payment 
processing has not only reduced the time and cost of processing transactions, but has 
allowed CBP to develop smarter risk-targeting capabilities and better ensure compliance 
with U.S. trade, safety, and security laws. The United States is not alone in this regard, 
with assessments indicating that government authorities typically request up to “200 data 
elements … in a trade transaction, of which 60–70% are re-keyed at least once, while 
                                                 
74 Private Sector Consultative Group, “Orientation Package for Decision Makers,” World Customs 
Organization, June 2013, 1, http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/capacity-
building/instruments-and-tools/orientation-package-decision-makers/or_package_decision_makers_ 
v2en.pdf?db=web. 
75 The legal basis for the CBP modernization effort is found in United States Customs Modernization 
Act, P.L. 103-182 (December 8, 1993). 
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15% are re-typed up to thirty times.”76 This is time consuming for both the trade 
community and the government authorities; and, for governments and businesses alike, 
time is money. 
1. Impact of Current Government Policies and Regulatory Environment  
Over the last several decades, tariff reductions worldwide have opened global 
markets and yielded some positive economic benefits. In their assessment of the impacts 
of this expansion of trade on the United States, the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics estimated that real incomes are “9% higher than they would otherwise have 
been as a result of trade liberalizing efforts since the Second World War,” representing 
$1.5 trillion in additional American income.77 However, more recent research by the 
World Economic Forum indicates that a slow rise of “protectionist measures, especially 
non-tariff barriers” (emphasis added), has slowed liberalization efforts since 2007.78 A 
growing body of research demonstrates that the United States is not immune to these 
challenges. Specifically, findings from the World Economic Forum, the World Bank, and 
the OECD indicate that current U.S. government security requirements and other 
regulations constructed in and for a previous century have begun to impact the growth 
and benefits of global trade to the United States. These organizations provide 
benchmarking tools for public and private-sector decision-makers across the world to 
assess the progress of domestic reforms as well as their competitiveness compared to 
others in the global economy. The graphic in Figure 1, from the World Economic 
Forum’s 2016 Enabling Trade Report, provides a helpful overview of the organizations 
that use extensive surveys and actual trade data to develop regular reports on various 
trade facilitation indicators. 
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77 “Resource Center: Economy and Trade,” United States Trade Representative, accessed August 4, 
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Figure 1.  Organizations Providing Trade Facilitation Indicators79 
This paper relies on a subset of the trade facilitation indicators provided in these 
reports to assess the various policy options presented later.80 However, at this point it is 
sufficient to note that the specific indicators vary among the reports but tend to mirror the 
non-tariff measures that businesses encounter when importing and exporting. For 
example, the indicators provide qualitative or quantitative assessments of a nation’s 
trade-enabling infrastructure (such as ports and highways, or enabling services such as 
brokers or logistics providers); border administration capabilities (to include the 
transparency, efficiency, and level of modernization of customs administration and 
import/export processes); regulatory and legal environment; and overall operating 
environment for businesses (to include factors such as Internet availability, physical 
security, political stability, and market access).  
  
                                                 
79 Source: World Economic Forum and Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation, The Global Enabling 
Trade Report: 2016 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2016), 7.  
80 Appendix Table 8 details the trade facilitation indicators used by the World Economic Forum, the 
World Bank, and the OECD.  
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While the data provided by these reports may not be appropriate for close 
statistical analysis, the findings provide helpful insights into trends over time and could 
perhaps motivate decision-makers to identify areas of concern and re-think associated 
policies. For example, data from the World Economic Forum’s biannual enabling trade 
reports indicate a decline in the United States overall score on the “Enabling Trade 
Index” from 5.4 to 5.0 (on a scale of 1–7, with 7 being the best performance; see 
Figure 2).81 
 
Scale of 1–7, with 7 representing best performance 
Figure 2.  World Economic Forum Enabling Trade (ETI) Indicators: Average of 
U.S. Scores across all ETI Categories (2008–2014)82 
  
                                                 
81 See Appendix Table 9, “Comparison of Enabling Trade Index Coverage from 2008–2014.” Figure 2 
explains that the addition of new nations to the reports between 2008 and 2014 have a nominal effect on the 
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82 Adapted from Robert Z. Lawrence et al., The Global Enabling Trade Report 2008 (Geneva: World 
Economic Forum, 2008), xx–xxi, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalEnablingTrade_Report_ 
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Geiger, and Doherty, The Global Enabling Trade Report 2014. 
The World Economic Forum’s biannual enabling trade reports assess progress made by nations 
worldwide based on their ETIs. The ETI is composed of four major indicator categories: border 
administration, market access, infrastructure, and business environment. These categories are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter III. 
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While a variety of factors influences the scores and rankings, and is discussed 
later in this paper, it is insightful that the results of the organization’s respected Executive 
Opinion Survey in both 2012 and 2014 identified “burdensome import procedures” as the 
“most problematic factor for importing.”83 This concern with the inadequacy of import 
processes and policies is supported further by a comparison of the United States’ scores 
for the specific “border administration” category against global best practices in the same 
category. The border administration category measures the effectiveness of the clearance 
process at the border, the time and cost required to import goods into a specific nation, 
the number of documents required for import, and the efficiency of relevant customs 
administrations. As can be seen in Figure 3, the United States’ scores have improved 
from 5.3 (on a scale of 1–7) in 2008 to 5.7 in 2014. However, the improvement has not 
brought the United States on par with global leaders in this important category, most 
notably the trade hubs of Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan. 
 
Scale of 1–7, with 7 representing best performance 
Figure 3.  World Economic Forum Enabling Trade Indicators: Comparison of 
U.S. Scores for ETI Indicator “Border Administration” to Global Best 
Practice (2008–2014)84 
 
                                                 
83 Lawrence, Hanouz, and Doherty, The Global Enabling Trade Report 2012, 352; Hanouz et al., The 
Global Enabling Trade Report 2014, 312. 
84 Adapted from Robert Z. Lawrence et al., The Global Enabling Trade Report 2008, xx–xxi; 
Lawrence et al., Enabling Trade Report 2010, 10; Lawrence, Hanouz, and Doherty, Enabling Trade Report 
2012, 11; Hanouz, Geiger, and Doherty, Enabling Trade Report 2014, 12. For more information on the 
other global leaders in the border administration category, see Appendix Table 10, “World Economic 
Forum Enabling Trade Index, Global Rankings for Border Administration Indicator Category (2008–
2014).”  
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Reports from the World Bank also indicate that the United States has room for 
improvement in areas associated with managing the cross-border flows of trade, 
specifically imports. As Figure 4 indicates, the United States’ overall logistic 
performance indicator scores (“Total LPI”) have improved modestly from 2007 to 2014 
(from 3.84 to 3.92 on a scale of 1–5, with 5 being the best performance). 
 
Scale of 1–5, with 5 representing best performance 
Figure 4.  World Bank Logistics Performance Indicators: U.S. Scores across all 
LPI Categories (2007–2014)85 
  
                                                 
85 Adapted from “Country Score Card: United States 2007,” The World Bank, accessed June 17, 
2017, http://lpi.worldbank.org/international/scorecard/radar/254/C/USA/2007/; “Country Score Card: 
United States 2010,” The World Bank, accessed June 17, 2017, 
http://lpi.worldbank.org/international/scorecard/ 
radar/254/C/USA/2010/; “Country Score Card: United States 2012,” The World Bank, accessed June 17, 
2017, http://lpi.worldbank.org/international/scorecard/radar/254/C/USA/2012/; “Country Score Card: 
United States 2014,” The World Bank, accessed June 17, 2017, http://lpi.worldbank.org/international/ 
scorecard/radar/254/C/USA/2014/.  
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However, the scores have remained relatively low in the specific “customs” category and 
declined slightly in the “ease of shipment” category during that timeframe. The contrast 
between U.S. and global leaders’ scores in the specific “customs” indicator is particularly 
striking. As seen in Figure 5, the United States’ scores here remain well below the top 
scores despite steady improvement over the last several years (up from 3.52 in 2007 to 
3.73 in 2014). 
 
Scale of 1–5, with 5 representing best performance 
Figure 5.  World Bank Logistics Performance Indicators: Comparison of U.S. 
Scores for LPI Indicator “Customs” to Global Best 
Practice (2007–2014)86 
The OECD is the third major organization that uses established indicators to 
assess national and global performances in the trade environment. This organization’s 
assessments align with those of the World Economic Forum and the World Bank, 
showing declines in United States’ scores over the last several years as well as scores 
remaining below the global best practices. Per Figures 6 and 7, the OECD reports that 
U.S. scores have fallen slightly from 1.66 in 2012 to 1.65 in 2015 (on a scale of 0–2) and 
remain behind the top scores of global leaders in three of four key indicator 
measurements. 
                                                 
86 Adapted from World Bank, “Country Score Card: United States 2007”; “Country Score Card: 
United States 2010”; “Country Score Card: United States 2012”; “Country Score Card: United States 
2014.” Raw data available at http://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global/2007?sort=asc&order= 
Customs#datatable. For more information on the other global leaders in the “customs” category, see 
Appendix Table 11, “World Bank Logistics Performance Indicators, Global Rankings for Customs 
Indicator Category (2008–2014).” 
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Scale of 0–2 with 2 representing best performance 
Figure 6.  OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators: Average of Total U.S. Scores for 
all TFI Indicators (2015)87 
 
Scale of 0–2 with 2 representing best performance. Key TFI Indicators include procedures, 
documentation, automation, and internal border agency cooperation) 
Figure 7.  OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators: Comparison of U.S. Scores for 
Key TFI Indicators to Global Best Practice (2015)88 
  
                                                 
87 Adapted from “Trade Facilitation Indicators: United States Country Note,” OECD, accessed 
October 23, 2015, http://compareyourcountry.org/trade-facilitation.  
88 Adapted from “Trade Facilitation Indicators: United States,” OECD, “compare with best practice” 
button. In this assessment, “best practices” represent an average of the top quartile of nations included in 
the review. This information is available via an automated web-based tool provided by the organization. 
While the specific countries under the “best practices” categories were readily available for the World 
Economic Forum and World Bank data, they are not immediately accessible in this case and are not 
included, as they have nominal to no impact on assumptions and findings.  
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2. The Role of DHS in Trade Facilitation 
In the United States, an array of agencies and entities have a shared role in 
establishing the nation’s trade policy, laws, and strategic objectives. In fact, according to 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR), twenty-three entities across fifteen 
departments or independent agencies (including DHS) administer and enforce hundreds 
of U.S. and international trade laws. From a national-level and strategic perspective, the 
USTR is responsible “for developing and coordinating U.S. international trade, 
commodity, and direct investment policy, and overseeing negotiations with other 
countries,” and has the “primary responsibility, with the advice of the interagency trade 
policy organization, for developing and coordinating the implementation of U.S. trade 
policy” (emphasis added).89 The National Economic Council, established by executive 
order in 1993, shares similar responsibilities under its mandate to: 
Co coordinate economic policy advice to the President; to ensure that 
economic policy decisions and programs are consistent with the 
President’s stated goals, and to ensure that those goals are being 
effectively pursued; and to monitor implementation of the President’s 
economic policy agenda [emphasis added].90  
While not directly responsible for the establishing national trade policy, laws, or 
strategic objectives, DHS is responsible for enforcing these policies and laws and 
advancing these objectives in its role of ensuring the security, compliance, and 
facilitation of the cross-border flow of goods. In fact, since its creation, DHS has focused 
one of its five mission areas on ensuring that the goods being imported and exported 
across U.S. borders do not threaten citizens or endanger American interests. In a 
distinction that is important for later parts of this paper, DHS and other departments and 
agencies are therefore answerable to both the USTR and National Economic Council 
(NEC), who themselves are responsible for developing trade policies and ensuring that 
the goals of the national trade agenda “are being effectively pursued.”91 
                                                 
89 “Mission of the USTR,” United States Trade Representative, accessed March 19, 2017, 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/about-ustr.  
90 William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12835—Establishment of the National Economic Council 
(Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, January 25, 1993), Section 4. 
91 Clinton, Executive Order 12835, Section 4. 
 38 
However, DHS’s efforts to fulfil its mandates to implement trade policies and 
enforce trade laws without unduly hindering the flow of legitimate commerce have been 
slowed by the complexity and sheer scope of the task and the difficulties of stepping 
down from the state of heightened security generated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The 
Congressional Research Service gave voice to this incongruity between trade facilitation 
and trade enforcement activities that plagued early efforts to advance both goals in a 
recent report.  
Trade facilitation is in tension with trade enforcement and import security 
because trade facilitation involves promoting faster and more efficient 
trade flows, while trade enforcement and import security involve 
identifying and preventing illegal flows—tasks that often involve slower 
cargo flows and reduced efficiency. These competing pressures make the 
implementation of import policy a complex and difficult task.92 
Former President Obama’s release of the National Strategy for Global Supply 
Chain Security in early 2012 also highlighted this growing awareness of necessary and 
imminent change. That document explains that America rejects “the false choice between 
security and efficiency and firmly believe[s] that we can promote economic growth while 
protecting our core values as a nation and as a people.”93 The mantra, while not entirely 
new to DHS, was emphasized with increasing clarity in the QHSR reports for both 2010 
and 2014. The Department’s first QHSR report, released in 2010, advanced this 
perspective, insisting that, “we must and can achieve both greater security and greater 
interchange with the world.”94 The 2014 QHSR report provides the most recent and 
perhaps the most prescient account of this necessary relationship when asserting, for the 
first time, that homeland security not only supports but is “inseparable from economic 
security.”95 While DHS focused its homeland security activities throughout the first 
seven years on preventing, protecting, responding to, and recovering from terrorism, the 
                                                 
92 Vivian Jones and Marc R. Rosenblum, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, 
Enforcement, and Security (CRS Report No. R43014) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2013). 
93 The White House, National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security (Washington, DC: The 
White House, 2012), abstract, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=698202. 
94 DHS, 2014 QHSR, 24. 
95 Ibid., 31.  
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2010 and 2014 QHSR reports represent a growing appreciation that “this emphasis on 
terrorism does not capture the full range of interconnected threats and challenges that 
characterize today’s world.”96 Instead, “a robust notion of homeland security must take 
account of our essential need to safely, securely, and intensively engage the rest of the 
world—through trade, travel, and other exchanges.”97  
At the agency level, CBP also has emphasized its commitment to trade facilitation 
as an affirmative rather than an ancillary responsibility. The CBP’s most recent strategic 
plan, called Vision and Strategy 2020, “firmly establishes CBP’s role as the national 
leader in safeguarding our borders and promoting economic prosperity.”98 This document 
and other statements by CBP leadership emphasize the agency’s dual-pronged mission, 
namely, “to safeguard America’s borders thereby protecting the public from dangerous 
people and materials while enhancing the Nation’s global economic competitiveness by 
enabling legitimate trade and travel.”99 CBP typically highlights its enforcement of trade 
laws aimed at ensuring a level playing field for American businesses (for example, 
enforcement of intellectual property rights laws, monitoring of quotas imposed on certain 
goods, and restrictions against illegal dumping of goods in the U.S. market that have been 
illegally subsidized by foreign governments). CBP also has sought to draw a correlation 
between its efforts to streamline and simplify cross-border security and compliance 
requirements for imported and exported goods when noting its contribution to economic 
security. Again, as noted in their Vision and Strategy 2020 document,  
CBP recognizes that it has a direct responsibility for enhancing America’s 
economic competitiveness. This requires reducing barriers to the efficient 
flow of trade and travel, streamlining and unifying processes and 
procedures, and managing the volume of cargo and passengers by 
separating goods and travelers according to the risks they pose.100  
                                                 
96 Ibid., 14. 
97 Ibid. 
98 CBP, Vision and Strategy 2020: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan (Washington, 
DC: DHS), 3, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf.  
99 Ibid., 7.  
100 Ibid., 30.  
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The theme that homeland security is “inseparable from economic security” also 
pervades the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, CBP’s first 
authorizing legislation since 2003. The law emphasizes CBP’s trade facilitation mission 
by distinguishing it from traditional revenue collection and import safety responsibilities 
and requiring the agency to “coordinat[e], on behalf of the Department of Homeland 
Security, efforts among Federal agencies to facilitate legitimate trade and to enforce the 
customs and trade laws of the United States.”101  
These policy articulations represent an evolving appreciation for the integration 
between domestic and global transportation, communications, and infrastructure, and the 
resulting integrations of national economies. They also align with the theory that a strong 
economy not only financially supports national and homeland defense capabilities, but 
can augment, or at times supplant, military hegemony as an effective instrument when 
pursuing broader national and foreign policy objectives. According to this view, the 
global stage “is no longer a Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’ in which state actors seek 
to maintain security” purely through the accumulation and use of power.102 While a 
prosperous national economy does enable military hegemony, it also provides valuable 
leverage that strengthens diplomatic gravitas abroad and provides an effective means of 
influence, or even coercion, on the world stage. Political scientists Joseph Nye and 
Robert Keohane introduced the term “complex interdependence” to describe the new 
paradigm created by the rise of globalization and the increased interconnectedness among 
nations.103 The close ties among nations reduced the viability of military force as the 
primary instrument of achieving national objectives and, instead, necessitated the 
development of new trade policy tools and increased levels of economic cooperation and 
collaboration among world actors.  
Given the importance of national economic security to American welfare and 
interests, relevant U.S. government departments and agencies would be well advised to 
                                                 
101 Pub. L. No. 114-125, Section 2(2)(d).  
102 William R. Nester, Globalization, Wealth, and Power in the Twenty-first Century (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 2010), 11. 
103 Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
2nd edition (Glenview, IL: Person Education, 1989), 3–25.  
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consider how best to contribute their unique authorities and expertise. This thesis 
suggests that DHS can and should more aggressively leverage its uniquely 
comprehensive and robust border authorities to improve the current decentralized, 
antiquated, and inefficient manner in which the U.S. government as a whole manages the 
processing and ensures the security of imported goods. The assessment is timely in light 
of the intensified global interest in removing impediments to trade through improved 
trade facilitation measures at the border. CBP, along with customs administrations around 
the world, is increasingly at the center of broader government programs to reduce 
frictions at the border, modernize communications technologies, and streamline 
regulatory frameworks. The focus is unlikely to diminish, particularly in light of the 
World Trade Organization’s conclusion in 2014 of the long-awaited Trade Facilitation 
Agreement (TFA). Article 8 of the TFA places a heavy emphasis on the ability of 
agencies with control authorities or requirements at the border to “cooperate with one 
another and coordinate their activities in order to facilitate trade.”104 With the largest 
presence and the broadest law enforcement authorities at the border, CBP is well 
positioned to contribute, if not affirmatively lead, a program of trade reform and 
modernization that could dramatically improve the facilitation of cross-border commerce 
and support broader national competitiveness goals. 
  
                                                 
104 World Trade Organization, “Agreement on Trade Facilitation,” Article 8.  
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III. POLICY OPTIONS AND EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
This chapter very briefly introduces three strategic-level policy options for 
addressing the gaps and augmenting the strengths of DHS’s policy trade facilitation 
efforts. It then discusses the methodology and criteria by which each of the policy options 
are evaluated in the subsequent chapter. 
This thesis asserts that the national economy and the vital commercial flows that 
feed it are the sine quibus non of national influence, power, and security. However, new 
characteristics of the modern trade environment have the potential to weaken the United 
States’ economic security. In asserting that homeland security is “inseparable from 
economic security,” and affirming that part of its mission is to “enhanc[e] the Nation’s 
global economic competitiveness,” DHS bears responsibility for addressing these 
challenges and concerns.105  
As discussed previously, these activities have fallen in large part to CBP, who 
links its border enforcement mission to a complementary agenda of trade facilitation. 
CBP, and by extension DHS, contributes to the nation’s economic security directly by 
collecting revenue and enforcing laws that protect American businesses from unfair trade 
practices. However, the recent narrative in CBP messaging suggests a deeper 
commitment to trade facilitation—a commitment to advancing the goals of the concept as 
an affirmative rather than an ancillary responsibility. In this regard, CBP has sought to 
emphasize much more than its traditional revenue functions and focuses on efforts to 
streamline and simplify an array of additional government controls on cross-border trade 
when noting its contribution to economic security. These controls include not only the 
burgeoning number of post-9/11 security measures discussed previously, but health and 
safety, phytosanitary, sanitary, and environmental requirements as well.  
                                                 
105 DHS, 2014 QHSR, 31; CBP, Vision and Strategy 2020, 7. 
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A. POLICY OPTIONS 
This chapter identifies and assesses the advantages and challenges of three policy 
options by which DHS could better achieve its stated goal of pursuing both security and 
trade efficiency as mutual, rather than mutually exclusive, goals and contribute most to 
ensuring the nation’s economic security. Such an effort could improve trade facilitation 
and provide commercially meaningful benefits to public and private stakeholders alike. 
Each option builds upon the role that DHS, specifically CBP, can play to promote 
economic growth. While each option differs in the degree and intensity of reform needed, 
each could be pursued as part of a broader national trade facilitation policy agenda that 
places a premium on streamlining government processes and requirements associated 
with importing and exporting goods across our borders. Each option is outlined in more 
detail in subsequent sections; in brief, the three policy approaches are: 
1. Maintaining the Status Quo: DHS can stay the course, leading other 
agencies by its own example of modernization and commitment to the 
dual goals of trade enforcement and facilitation.  
2. Tailored Modernization: DHS can lead a program of collective action 
among a select group of agencies to improve trade facilitation in key areas 
most likely to exceed the “tipping point” necessary to result in meaningful 
benefits.  
3. Shifting the Paradigm: DHS can advocate for a shift toward a more 
centralized model of government controls of imports, one reliant upon 
standard performance measures, shared funding schemes, common IT 
infrastructures, and/or delegated or joint decision-making on the 
admissibility of goods.  
 
B. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
After introducing each of the policy options in greater detail, this thesis 
analytically assesses them according to three criteria: 1) the impact on the effectiveness 
and efficiency of overall import procedures, 2) the impacts on American businesses, and 
3) the feasibility of implementing the policy.  
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1. First Evaluation Criterion  
This evaluation utilizes the World Economic Forum’s “border administration” 
indicators to assess impacts on the overall efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. import 
procedures (the first evaluation criterion). While other organizations provide similar 
qualitative and quantitative indicators, the World Economic Forum’s border 
administration indicators are the most appropriate for several reasons. First, the indicators 
in this category cover topics that fall within DHS authorities or are subject to DHS or 
CBP influence. Additionally, as discussed previously, U.S. scores in the border 
administration category remain well behind global best practices, suggesting that there is 
room for improvement (see Figure 3 in Chapter II, Section B). Both the World Economic 
Forum and the World Bank highlight the “untapped potential” for improvements in this 
category, even for developed nations like the United States. The 2016 Global Enabling 
Trade Report notes that “the combination of political feasibility, affordability, promises 
of additional revenues, momentum and resource availability suggests that border 
administration is the low-hanging fruit of trade facilitation.”106 Finally, the World 
Economic Forum’s border administration indicators are the most helpful and relevant 
because they either incorporate fully or align with those provided by the World Bank and 
the OECD. 
Table 2 compares trade facilitation indicators provided by the World Economic 
Forum, the World Bank, and the OECD. As can be seen in the blue section, the World 
Economic Forum’s border administration indicator set includes or aligns with the 
indicators from the other organizations most relevant to this research. Other indicators, 
such as “infrastructure” or “market access” are not only beyond DHS’s responsibilities, 
but touch on topics outside the scope of this paper. 
                                                 
106 World Economic Forum and Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation, Global Enabling Trade 
Report 2016, 21. 
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107 Representative of various World Economic Forum, World Bank, and OECD documentation.  
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Table 3, developed by the author, lists the twenty-three indicators within the 
World Economic Forum’s border administration indicator set. To evaluate the impact of 
each policy option on the effectiveness and efficiency of import processes, the author 
assigned a numeric value to each of the sub-indicators within the border administration 
indicator set and compares the relative scores (0–23) of options. According to this scoring 
methodology, higher scores would reflect that the option has a greater potential of 
improving U.S. ratings in this important indicator category. 
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Table 3.   World Economic Forum’s Border Administration Indicators108 
Criterion 1: The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Import Processes 
Would the policy improve U.S. ratings in the World Economic Forum’s Border 
Administration category? 









Customs Service Index (0–12 points)  
• clearance of shipments via electronic data interchange 
• separation of physical release of goods from fiscal control 
• full-time automated processing 
• customs working hours adapted to commercial needs 
• fee for services conducted during normal service hours 
• inspection / release of goods arriving by air by the operator’s facility 
• automated risk assessment as basis for physical exam of shipments 
• # and promptness of inspections by agencies other than customs 
• exemptions from full customs for shipments of minimal value 
• exemptions from duties and taxes for shipments of minimal value 
• clearance of shipments by a third party 






Effectiveness / Efficiency of Clearance Process (0–4 points) 
• advanced information 
• post-clearance audits 
• authorized economic operators 







Time for Import (0–2 points) 
• less days to import 







Documents for Import (0–2 points) 
• less documents / information required 
• harmonization in accordance with international standards; 






Cost to Import (0–3 points)  
• improved predictability  
• IT requirements  










TOTAL SCORE    
 
                                                 
108 Adapted from World Economic Forum and Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation, Global 
Enabling Trade Report 2016,14. See Appendix Table 12, “Criterion 1: The Effectiveness and Efficiency of 
Import Processes” for the scores of each policy option according to the border administration indicators and 
associated sub-indicators. 
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2. Second Evaluation Criterion  
To assess the impact of each policy option on U.S. businesses (the second 
evaluation criterion), this paper utilizes 2013–2016 recommendations from the 
Commercial Operations Advisory Committee (COAC). As discussed previously, the 
COAC was established by law in 1987 and has since been charged with advising CBP 
(and by extension DHS) on a range of customs compliance and trade facilitation 
issues.109 Approximately half of the 281 recommendations provided by the Committee to 
DHS between 2013 and 2016 touched on trade facilitation. To evaluate the impact of 
each policy option on U.S. businesses, the author considered if the option could create 
improvements in any of the COAC recommendations focused on trade facilitation 
priorities or topics. The author reviewed the 281 COAC recommendations and identified 
the subset related to trade facilitation activities (as defined by the World Economic 
forum’s border administration index). After identifying the subset of recommendations 
that dealt with issues related to trade facilitation, the author assigned them to one of four 
major trade facilitation categories (shown in Table 4): industry partnerships (such as 
authorized economic operator programs), automation (such as Single Window portals or 
electronic messaging capabilities), other government agencies (topics focused on needed 
improvements by agencies other than CBP, or enhanced integration of processes, 
policies, or procedures across the U.S. government), and information/transparency (such 
as advance information requirements, targeting regimes, and performance 
measurements). The author then employed a simple binary scoring system of “yes” or 
“no” to assess if each of the policy options could create improvements or even fully 
address the COAC recommendations in any of the four trade facilitation categories.  
The graphic in Figure 8 illustrates the types of recommendations provided by 
COAC overall, as well as the specific categories of trade facilitation–related 
recommendations that are most relevant to this assessment. As can be seen, nearly half 
(47 percent) of the recommendations touched on trade facilitation issues, and of that 
subset, 32 percent sought reforms that involved agencies other than CBP. 
                                                 
109 Note that COAC was established to advise U.S. Customs in 1987, and continued in that role after 
U.S. Customs became U.S. Customs and Border Protection under DHS.  
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Table 4.   COAC Trade Facilitation Recommendations110 
Criterion 2: Benefit to U.S. Businesses 
Would the policy provide improvements that could address COAC recommendations 




COAC Trade Facilitation Recommendations  
 Industry 
Partnerships 
Automation Other Government 
Agencies 
Info/Transparency TOTAL 
1      
2      
3      
 
 
Topics of total recommendations from 2013–2016 compared with topics of the subset of 
recommendations focused on trade facilitation issues. 
Figure 8.  COAC Recommendations111 
                                                 
110 Adapted from “FY 2013–2015 COAC Recommendations,” CBP. See Appendix Table 13, 
“Criterion 2: Benefit to U.S. Businesses,” for the scores of each policy option according to Trade 
Facilitation recommendations from the COAC. 
111 Ibid. 
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3. Third Evaluation Criterion  
To assess the feasibility of implementing each of the policy options (the third 
evaluation criterion), this paper utilizes a scatter chart, shown in Figure 9, to distinguish 
between possible “quick-wins” that can be accomplished within the existing DHS 
mission and/or authorities and budget, and “longer-term solutions” that would require 
mission expansion, and additional authorities and funding.112 The author reviews the 
DHS mission as defined by the 2014 QHSR, recent legislation, and budget documents to 
assess if the proposed activities fall within or outside the scope of the current DHS 
mission, authorities, and funding streams. 
How feasible is implementation of the policy option? 
 
Figure 9.  Criterion 3: Feasibility of Implementation113 
  
                                                 
112 See Appendix Figure 13, “Criterion 3: Feasibility of Implementation.”  
113 “Feasibility” is defined as the degree to which the policy option requires new authorities and/or 
new funding. 
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IV. EVALUATING THE POLICY OPTIONS 
This chapter assesses the opportunities and challenges of each option according to 
the established evaluation criteria. The three policy options are: 
• Policy Option 1: Maintain the Status Quo 
• Policy Option 2: Tailored Modernization 
• Policy Option 3: Shifting the Paradigm 
 
A. POLICY OPTION 1: MAINTAIN THE STATS QUO 
Since its establishment in 2003, DHS (through CBP) has worked to perform its 
revenue collection and trade law enforcement missions without hindering the flow of 
legitimate trade. The scope, complexity, and dynamic pace of this mission are vast, 
involving sustained operations at 328 domestic ports of entry; engagement with 365,000 
importers of record, 13,500 customs brokers, and forty-seven federal agencies; 
processing of an estimated 150 million trade transactions a year; enforcement of fourteen 
free trade agreements with twenty countries; and, of course, the collection of $40 billion 
in duties, taxes, and fees.114  
To accomplish this, CBP has continued a significant modernization effort initiated 
in 1993 under the legacy U.S. Customs with the passage of what is known as the Customs 
Modernization and Informed Compliance Act, or “Mod Act.”115 This seminal piece of 
legislation redefined the relationship between Customs and the trade community, shifting 
some administrative responsibilities from the government to businesses with the new 
                                                 
114  “Oversight of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency,” Testimony of Commissioner Gil 
Kerlikowske before the Senate Finance Committee, April 21, 2016, 1, https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/ 
media/doc/CBP%20Kerlikowske%20Oversight%20Testimony_SFC_051116.pdf. 
115 Pub. L. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057. 
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concepts of “reasonable care” and “informed compliance.”116 In short, the new 
requirements sought to “address the tension between trade facilitation and trade 
enforcement by replacing the historical ‘agency-centric’ model of trade enforcement with 
a ‘shared responsibility’ approach.”117 Businesses generally accepted these new duties in 
light of the legislation’s requirements on Customs to improve the automation, 
consistency, and transparency of its own processes and thereby speed the importation 
process.  
The Mod Act requirements spurred a period of major reform within CBP and 
continue to inform the organization’s approach to enforcing trade laws and securing 
imports without unduly hindering the flow of legitimate commerce. The law provided a 
foundation for CBP’s current approach to border security, which places a premium on 
risk-informed decision making, layers of defense, and improved automation. As 
explained by CBP leadership, “By utilizing a risk-based strategy and multilayered 
security approach, CBP can focus time and resources on those suspect shipments that are 
high-risk which, in turn, allows CBP to expedite legitimate trade.”118 At the most 
strategic level, the salient features of CBP’s approach include:  
• Advance Information: Receiving information from carriers and importers 
about shipments prior to those goods arriving in the United States. These 
data include a description of the goods; the names and addresses of 
entities; the importer, exporter, consignee, and others involved in the 
transaction; the origin of the goods; and locations through which the 
shipment moved prior to transport to the United States. 
• Targeting: Analyzing the advance information, along with data from other 
law enforcement and intelligence holdings, to identify shipments that pose 
a higher risk. 
                                                 
116 These concepts are further detailed in CBP, What Every Member of the Trade Community Should 
Know about Reasonable Care (Washington, DC: DHS, 2004), 26. In this document, the term “informed 
compliance” is defined as a “shared responsibility between CBP and the import community wherein CBP 
effectively communicates its requirements to the trade, and the people and business subject to those 
requirements conduct their regulated activities in accordance with U.S. laws and regulations.” The term 
“reasonable care” is defined with less precision as an “explicit responsibility on the part of the importer.”  
117 Jones and Seghetti, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 9.  
118 “Prevention of Smuggling at U.S. Ports,” testimony of CBP Office of Field Operations Executive 
Assistant Commissioner Todd Owen for a joint House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation and House Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, July 7, 2016, 1. 
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• Partnerships: Leveraging public–private partnerships, where shippers 
voluntarily add security measures to their existing processes, where 
imports can engage with CBP to facilitate post-entry processing for 
targeted industries, and where foreign governments can work to “mutually 
recognize” the equivalency of their cargo security regimes with the United 
States.119 
• Automation: Prioritizing electronic data collection, analysis, and 
messaging capabilities and other digital enhancements to reduce the 
historic reliance on time-consuming and costly manual processing of 
paper-based information. The most significant example of CBP’s drive 
toward automation is its development, on behalf of the U.S. government, 
of a secure web portal (called the International Trade Data System or, 
more commonly, the Single Window) to enable businesses to 
electronically submit the import declarations and other data required for 
entry into the United States.  
Under the first policy option, CBP would continue to leverage existing authorities 
and current budget allocations to maintain the current risk-based, multi-layered approach 
to ensure the security of goods crossing the U.S. border. The agency would provide a 
model to other government authorities with border-related responsibilities, in effect 
“leading by example” by demonstrating the efficiencies to be gained through a 
commitment to trade facilitation opportunities such as risk management, public–private 
partnerships, transparency, streamlined import requirements, and automated border 
processes. As discussed in Chapter II, these trade facilitation efforts are the means by 
which DHS can contribute to the reduction of non-tariff measures, which, if reduced, 
could increase global GDP by nearly 5 percent and trade by 15 percent.120 
                                                 
119 DHS’s program is called the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program. 
Under C-TPAT, the private-sector partner integrates security measures into its business operations (e.g., 
employee background checks, facility access controls, in-transit chain of custody measures, and container 
examinations prior to loading). Internationally, these programs are often referred to as authorized economic 
operator (AEO) programs; AEO programs are now widely used.  
CBP established ten virtual Centers of Excellence and Expertise to “increase uniformity of practices 
across ports of entry, facilitate the timely resolution of trade compliance issues nationwide, and further 
strengthen critical agency knowledge on key industry practices.” “Centers of Excellence and Expertise,” 
CBP, October 25, 2016, https://www.cbp.gov/trade/centers-excellence-and-expertise-information. 
Under Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRA), trading partners mutually recognize each other’s 
cargo security AEO regimes, and extend the program benefits to each other’s AEO program members. 
According to written testimony in 2016, CBP has ten such arrangements. “Oversight of the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection Agency,” Testimony of Commissioner Gil Kerlikowske, 3. 
120 World Economic Forum, Enabling Trade: Valuing Growth Opportunities, 4. 
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1. Advantages 
This first policy option presents several distinct advantages by which CBP/DHS 
could improve trade facilitation and thereby contribute to the nation’s economic security 
by providing commercially meaningful benefits to public and private stakeholders alike. 
First, CBP has worked successfully over the last several decades to implement an 
aggressive modernization campaign focused on the strategic elements noted in the 
previous section. The cornerstone of this modernization campaign is CBP and DHS’s 
leadership role in the development and operation of the International Trade Data System 
(to be referenced hereafter as the Single Window). As described in Homeland Security, as 
a part of this effort, 
CBP worked hand-in-hand with dozens of other U.S. Government 
Departments and independent agencies to build an information 
communication technology platform that will allow businesses to provide 
a single, simplified set of electronic data to fulfill regulatory and 
administrative requirements of multiple government agencies. This will 
replace the current heavy reliance on paper forms and manual processes 
and has the potential to transform border management for the United 
States.121 
According to the World Bank’s “Doing Business” project, businesses can expect 
to pay the equivalent of $1,050 per container to export goods from the United States, 
$230 of which, on average, is for preparation of the forty documents required. Often, data 
is provided on paper and coordination between agencies is largely manual.122 This is 
costly and time consuming for both the trade community and the government authorities, 
complicates coordinated border management efforts, and slows commerce. By 
eliminating manual processes, paper forms, and duplicative reporting requirements, the 
Single Window allows regulators to conduct coordinated and rapid assessments of goods 
presented for import or export in minutes rather than days.123 Business users, on the other 
                                                 
121 Christa Brzozowski, “E Pluribus Unum…SINGLE WINDOW!?!,” Homeland Security blog, 
December 17, 2014, https://medium.com/homeland-security/e.pluiribus-unum-9251abd4324c. 
122 World Bank, “Cost to Export (US$ per Container),” accessed June 18, 2017, http://data.world 
bank.org/indicator/IC.EXP.COST.CD. 
123 For example, the UN/CEFACT assessed that over 90 percentof the data collected by various U.S. 
agencies through over 300 different forms is redundant. UN/CEFACT, UN/CEFACT, Recommendation 
No. 33, 20.  
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hand, see reductions in costly data submission processes and border wait times as well as 
improved transparency and increased predictability. 
Required by law to develop, operate, and maintain this new digital platform, CBP 
is well positioned to enable meaningful trade facilitation improvements for customs-
specific services and thereby improve the United States’ scores in that subset of the 
World Economic Forum’s border administration category.124 Through the Single 
Window and associated modernization efforts, CBP has been able to provide eleven of 
the twelve services identified in the customs service index, resulting in a score of eleven 
for the first evaluative criterion.125 CBP is able to model the benefits of its own reform 
and modernization agenda to the dozens of agencies with border-related missions and 
requirements (such as consumer health and safety, phytosanitary and sanitary, security, 
and environmental agencies).126 However, as discussed in the next section, more work is 
necessary to improve scores in the eleven remaining border administration indicators that 
require action from other government agencies and private-sector collaboration.  
In addition, the current approach—in which CBP “stays the course” and remains 
committed to advancing its own modernization campaign to improve trade enforcement 
and facilitation—is highly feasible. Being the status quo, the first policy option has the 
distinct advantage of obviously being highly feasible to implement within existing DHS 
funding allocations and authorities. Over the last five years, the total DHS budget 
authority has remained between $59.9 billion and $64.9 billion, with net discretionary 
funding ranging from $40 billion to $46.3 billion.127 These resources support DHS 
mission areas that have evolved over time but always included a focus on border security 
                                                 
124 The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act, P.L. 109-347, Title IV, §405 (2006).  
125 The customs service index includes twelve of twenty-three indicators within the border 
administration category. See Appendix Table 12, “Criterion 1: The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Import 
Processes.” 
126 According to annual reports from the International Trade Data System Board of Directors, 
testimony and public speeches made by CBP and DHS leadership, and White House press releases, the 
total number of U.S. agencies involved in the Single Window effort generally is indicated to be forty-seven.  
127 “Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 2013,” DHS, accessed June 18, 2017, www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/dhs-budget-in-brief-fy2013.pdf; “Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 2015,” DHS, accessed 
June 18, 2017, www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY15BIB.pdf; “Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 
2017,” DHS, accessed June 18, 2017, www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2017BIB.pdf.  
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and trade facilitation.128 Calculating exact expenditures on the array of trade security, 
enforcement/compliance, and facilitation efforts is a difficult task in light of the 
integration of these missions at the border and the involvement of multiple DHS 
components. However, as even a rough calculation serves to provide some context, it is 
helpful to appreciate that CBP is among the largest of the DHS components, with a 
budget representing 21 percent of the total. Other components involved in securing cross-
border trade include U.S. Coast Guard (15 percent), Transportation Security 
Administration (11 percent), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (10 percent), 
but none have the decided focus on both trade security and facilitation as CBP does.129  
While additional funds could certainly support improvements to the current CBP 
trade facilitation approach, the organization has clearly achieved the accomplishments to-
date within the current budget constraints. DHS and CBP’s mission and current 
authorities represent clear advantages for pursing the “status quo,” the first policy option. 
In fact, Congress has continued to emphasize the importance of the CBP trade mission 
and authorities, reasserting as recently as 2015 that the agency “ensure the overall 
economic security of the United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, and 
programs aimed at securing the homeland.”130 As a law enforcement agency, CBP has 
strong authorities to secure the people and goods crossing the border and ensure 
compliance with all relevant laws. A few salient examples include CBP’s authority to 
collect manifest information from air, land, and sea modes of transportation, entry and 
invoice information on all goods crossing the border, and the uniquely broad authority to 
search and seize merchandise and assess penalties.131 CBP’s border search and seizure 
                                                 
128 As of early 2017, the five DHS mission priorities include: 1) Prevent Terrorism and Enhance 
Security, 2) Secure and Manage Borders, 3) Enforce and Administer Immigration Laws, 4) Safeguard and 
Secure Cyberspace, and 5) Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience. “Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 
2017,” DHS, 2–6. 
129 “Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 2016,” DHS, accessed June 18, 2017, 9, www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf.  
130 Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, P.L. 114-125, February 24, 2016, 
Section 7. 
131 Information collection authorities (manifest and entry for all modes of transportation) can be found 
generally at 19 U.S.C. 1431, 1644a, 2071 and 19 U.S.C. 1481 and 1484. Authority for the examination of 
merchandise is at 19 U.S.C. 1499 and for searches and seizures at 19 U.S.C. 1595.  
 59 
authority is particularly powerful in its reach; the authority extends beyond a violation of 
CBP’s requirements and includes violations of any U.S. government law that impacts the 
admissibility of goods. In short, CBP can search and/or seize imported (and exported) 
goods if the agency “has probable cause to believe that … duties have not been paid, or 
which has been otherwise brought into the United States unlawfully,” meaning “any 
property which is subject to forfeiture under any provision of law enforced or 
administered by the United States Customs Service.”132 These authorities have supported 
CBP’s trade facilitation, security, and enforcement mission to-date and, by extension, its 
contributions to the nation’s economic security.  
2. Challenges  
Despite several advantages, this first policy option also presents several 
challenges to CBP and DHS’s ability to improve trade facilitation measures and, by 
association, contribute to overall efforts to strengthen national economic security. The 
elements of the “status quo” option outlined previously in this chapter have served DHS 
and CBP well and could provide a model for other relevant government agencies. 
However, evidence to-date suggests that, absent a concerted effort to better integrate and 
simplify the web of import-related government policies, procedures, and requirements, 
service levels at the border could actually worsen. This will hinder the U.S. government’s 
ability to provide commercially meaningful benefits to businesses and could add to 
administrative costs for agencies. The fact that CBP has been the vanguard of 
modernization among U.S. border agencies is not unusual. As experts from the World 
Bank have explained,  
Customs performance tends to be better than that of other border agencies; 
on average, customs clearance accounts for a third of import time. This 
underscores the importance of addressing the coordination of border 
agencies, especially in countries that already have attained good customs 
clearance [emphasis added].133 
                                                 
132 19 U.S.C 1595. 
133 Jean-François Arvis et al., Connecting to Compete 2007: Trade Logistics in the Global Economy 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2007), 14. 
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In Executive Order 13659, Streamlining the Export/Import Process for America’s 
Businesses, the U.S. government established a deadline of December 2016 for the 
completion of the Single Window and “signaled its intent to transition from a heavy 
reliance on distinct systems, standards, and operational processes and toward 
consistency” in the collection, utilization, and delivery of information.134 As the author 
of this thesis previously described in Homeland Security,  
The intent of this transition to electronic data elements (over paper forms) 
is to promote information sharing among agencies, improve targeting and 
risk assessment, and facilitate the movement of legitimate trade by 
assisting government decision-making. The transition is also intended to 
reduce the burden of compliance on industry and make the importing and 
exporting processes as simple and cost effective as possible. While the 
Single Window will provide new technical capabilities for collecting and 
sharing data, it is much more than an IT development project. Rather, the 
effort requires a fundamental change in the way that agencies work with 
each other and with the private sector. … Experts from within and outside 
of government have highlighted the dangers inherent in too reflexive or 
too sudden of a transition from today’s manual and paper processes into a 
much faster electronic, automated trade environment. The risk is that … 
we speed inefficiencies and trigger an avalanche of unintended 
consequences.135 
Perhaps with these risks in mind, the Executive Order challenged agencies to re-think 
current policies and processes to achieve “measurable improvements” in trade facilitation 
and enforcement in the near-term and beyond. 
Despite the potential value to be realized through the Single Window, the ongoing 
exercise of identifying and eliminating redundant requirements, simplifying processes, 
and translating existing paper forms to electronic data formats unearthed, not 
surprisingly, a number of complications. As one change management expert cautioned,  
Heavy investments in information technology have delivered 
disappointing results—largely because companies tend to use technology 
to mechanize old ways of doing business. They leave the existing 
processes intact and use computers simply to speed them up. … But 
                                                 
134 Christa Brzozowski, “The United States’ Single Window: A Year in Review,” Homeland Security 




speeding up those processes cannot address their fundamental 
performance deficiencies.136  
One example of this challenge is found in the ongoing aggressive transition of 
information collection from paper or through the Digital Imaging System (DIS) function 
to machine readable electronic data elements that can be tagged, manipulated, shared, and 
presented in myriad useful ways.137 This hallmark feature of the new Single Window 
digital environment has the potential to greatly improve agencies’ ability to stop illicit 
shipments through improved targeting. If done correctly, the effort will also simplify and 
streamline the data requirements and reduce the overall burden on industry stakeholders. 
However, some questions have arisen as agencies work to transition current paper-based 
collections to electronic data elements and reduce their reliance on the DIS function. For 
example, as they look to more fully leverage the automated capabilities to be enabled by 
the Single Window, agencies may find value in transitioning large amounts of data (or 
perhaps even the bulk of their requirements) into electronic data elements. This may have 
a negative impact if filers have to devote up-front time and resources to manually key in a 
much larger set of data, and could invite criticism of the U.S. government’s commitment 
to streamline and simplify that process. On the other hand, too heavy a continued reliance 
on the DIS function would undermine the value of the Single Window system. 
Another challenge to the status quo policy option is that, while CBP is responsible 
for collecting data on behalf of other U.S. government agencies through the Single 
Window, other agencies often rely upon their own legacy systems to receive the data and 
assess trade compliance. This exchange of data is complicated by the array of systems 
and technical formats used within the U.S. government. Also, the relative ease of 
collecting and assessing electronic information (versus paper documents) has triggered 
what some in industry have termed “government data creep,” namely requirements for 
                                                 
136 Michael Hammer, “Reengineering Work: Don’t Automate, Obliterate,” Harvard Business Review 
(July–August 1990), https://hbr.org/1990/07/reengineering-work-dont-automate-obliterate. 
137 DIS functions allow importers to supply supporting documentation electronically to the Single 
Window as image files, or scans of paper documents. Problematically, information received via DIS 
requires manual review. More information on DIS background and capabilities is available at CBP, 
Document Imaging System Implementation Guide (Washington, DC: DHS, 2015), https://www.cbp.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/DIS_XML_Implementation_Guide_July_2015.pdf. 
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more or different data than had been required prior to the modernization. In addition, the 
government’s technical capabilities to assess the import data provided by trade is not yet 
centralized in the Single Window. Rather, data review and decision making about the 
admissibility of goods largely occurs within individual agencies, slowing processing and 
increasing the overall costs of administration for government. Again, the United States is 
not unique in facing these challenges; experts on the topic have highlighted that  
While automation/computerization can increase the efficiency of well-run 
operations, it is not a miracle solution to existing problems. Automation of 
customs procedures needs to be part of an overall modernization project if 
it is to avoid the inappropriate introduction of computer systems that can 
exacerbate existing problems.138 
Data from a series of COAC “Trade Efficiency Surveys” support the view that 
CBP’s modernization efforts, while well received by industry, have not yet been fully 
adopted by the other government actors involved in the import process. In the surveys, 
industry ratings of “‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’ with CBP’s trade facilitation capabilities 
grew from 78% in 2010 to 83% in 2014. Compare these scores with the 36% satisfaction 
ranking for other government agencies in 2012, which increased to 46% in 2014 but still 
remained a bit more than half of the CBP score.”139 The discrepancy in the private 
sector’s survey responses affirms a caution provided by the World Economic Forum that 
“reform of border and domestic barriers is less straightforward than changes to explicit 
outward-facing trade policy. Collaboration is needed among multiple government 
departments … and other actors.”140 
In short, the main disadvantage of the first “status quo” policy option is that it 
does not allow for the necessary improvements to the border administration indicators 
                                                 
138 Michael Engman and Tadashi Yasui, “The Role of Modernization in Trade Facilitation,” in 
Overcoming Border Bottlenecks: The Costs and Benefits of Trade Facilitation (Paris: OECD, 2009), 146. 
139 The COAC has conducted the Trade Efficiency Survey since 2012, “to establish a benchmark for 
costs associated with importing and exporting goods into and out of the United States, understand the key 
cares of trade, strengthen inter- and intra- governmental operations to promote efficient compliance, and 
report trends.” “2014 COAC Trade Efficiency Survey Findings,” CBP, accessed January 21, 2017, 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/COAC%202014%20Trade%20Efficiency%20Survey%2
0Findings.pdf. 
140 World Economic Forum and Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation, The Global Enabling Trade 
Report 2016, 5.  
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that involve agencies other than CBP. The activities detailed each of the sub-indexes 
other than the “customs service index” require extensive coordination, collaboration, and 
perhaps even integration among the forty-seven agencies with responsibilities for 
controlling cross-border trade.141 Therefore, the initial score of eleven provided earlier in 
this chapter for the first evaluative criterion is not improved under the first policy option 
and remains static.142 In addition, the option scores low on certain aspects of the second 
evaluation criterion, which asks if the policy would provide improvements that could 
address COAC recommendations focused on trade facilitation. In particular, it does not at 
all address the recommendations associated with “other government agencies” and 
therefore receives a score of zerio in that category; it does not change the status of 
“industry partnerships” beyond those already established by CBP, so receives a zero in 
that category; and although it does improve automation through the development of the 
Single Window and attendant digital capabilities, it does not adequately address COAC 
concerns with the unintended consequences of automation in the complex supply chain 
environment, so receives a zero in that category.143 
The overall evaluation criteria scores for policy option 1 are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Policy Option 1 Evaluation 










1 Status Quo 11 1 Easy 
2 Tailored Modernization    
3 Shifting the Paradigm    
 
                                                 
141 Per Appendix Table 12, these other sub-indicators include “effectiveness and efficiency of the 
clearance process,” “time for import,” “documents for import,” and “cost to import.” 
142 The customs service index includes twelve of twenty-three indicators within the border 
administration category. See Appendix Table 12, “Criterion 1: The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Import 
Processes.” 
143 See Appendix Table 13, “Criterion 2: Benefit to U.S. Businesses.”  
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B. POLICY OPTION 2: TAILORED MODERNIZATION 
DHS can lead a program of collective action among a select group of agencies to 
improve trade facilitation in key areas most likely to exceed the “tipping point” necessary 
to result in meaningful benefits.  
Building and implementing a national Single Window is a significant 
undertaking, involving many stakeholders and requiring commitment from government 
and business entities.144 Experts agree that modernization of trade infrastructures like 
Single Window systems can enhance efficiencies to benefit public and private-sector 
stakeholders and improve government’s ability to enforce trade laws.145 However, the 
uncertain process of obtaining national-level commitment and political will, coordinating 
policies and technical systems among the dozens of border agencies with authorities, and 
negotiating omnipresent funding limitations can complicate the process. As discussed 
previously, the modernization of customs processes is a positive start and can influence 
some parts of the process, but significant improvement cannot be made without similar 
progress from the array of other government stakeholders at the border. Gaozhang Zhu, 
director of enforcement and facilitationg at the World Customs Organization, further 
emphasizes this point:  
Interest in better and smarter border management is at an all-time high. 
Driving this interest has been the need to boost economic growth and 
development, while maintaining high levels of compliance to guarantee 
the safety and security of citizens as well as the collection of revenue. 
Governments in general, and customs more specifically, can contribute 
significantly to economic growth through modernization and automation, 
and through collaboration with other government agencies and trade.146 
Policy option 1 proposed that DHS should “stay the course” and contribute to the 
nation’s economic security by modeling its own successful campaign of modernization 
                                                 
144 For more information on Single Window development requirements and needs, see World 
Customs Organization, How to Build a Single Window Environment; UN/CEFACT, Recommendation 
No. 33.  
145 These benefits were discussed in detail in Chapter II. 
146 World Economic Forum, Enabling Trade: Enabling Smart Borders (Geneva: World Economic 
Forum, 2014), 5, http://reports.weforum.org/enabling-trade-from-valuation-to-action/wp-content/blogs.dir/ 
38/mp/files/pages/files/5-enabling-smart-borders.pdf.  
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and commitment to trade facilitation. This option envisioned a “lead from example” 
paradigm in which CBP would leverage its role as developer and operator of the Single 
Window to influence change among the dozens of other agencies with import-related 
requirements and responsibilities. While highly feasible, this option would not have 
addressed the complications noted by industry stakeholders arising from the continued 
web of requirements and other government agency border processes that, if left 
unaddressed, could lead to unintended negative consequences with the advent of 
automation.  
Policy option 2 would seek to address this gap. Under this policy option, CBP 
would lead reform efforts among a subset of key agencies whose requirements and/or 
internal processes present the most significant barriers to international trade through their 
complexity, inconsistency, redundancy, or even obsolescence. Importantly, under this 
option DHS would work with other government agencies and industry partners to follow 
the recommendation offered to governments by the World Economic Forum in light of 
the complexity and “heterogeneity in supply chain barriers.” Because of this, the 
organization advises governments interested in making meaningful progress in trade 
facilitation to “understand their existing industries and potential future industries, and 
prioritize [for reform] which barriers are most costly to those industries.”147 DHS and 
other agencies could identify the most problematic barriers (in essence the “low-hanging 
fruit”) by relying on the extensive body of trade survey data, indicators such as the World 
Economic Forum’s border administration index, and global reporting on the most 
problematic non-tariff barriers to trade. The distinguishing factor of policy option 2 is its 
selectivity; rather than instituting a broad agenda of reform among the dozens of relevant 
U.S. agencies, CBP would prioritize work with the handful of agencies with whom 
coordination is most likely to effect the tipping point necessary for consequential change. 
Recent guidance from the World Economic Forum explains the rationale behind this 
approach: 
 
                                                 
147 World Economic Forum, Enabling Trade: Valuing Growth Opportunities, 5. 
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Most macroeconomic trade models assume that the relationship between 
removing a supply chain barrier and the resultant effect on trade is a 
continuous function. But the case studies in this report suggest that 
removing barriers has an effect only when the effort reaches a tipping 
point. Companies conduct rigorous analyses to determine profitable 
geographies for production and sale of their goods. These analyses are 
generally binary: the company either chooses to produce and/or sell in a 
specific market or does not. Incremental reductions in trade barriers thus 
may have no impact until a certain “set” of barriers is removed.148 
In short, DHS will pursue objectives outlined in policy option 1 but will develop 
an enhanced Single Window that enables not only the submission of electronic data from 
industry to government regulators, but the automated risk assessment of that data among 
key agencies, and more efficient government-to-business communication when involving 
key agencies. In addition, DHS will spearhead a modest campaign to streamline the 
current regulatory environment among key agencies and better coordinate, and in some 
cases integrate, government decision-making processes associated with the admissibility 
of imports to reduce costs and improve efficiencies and effectiveness.  
1. Advantages  
A key advantage of policy option 2, under which DHS would lead a program of 
reform among a select group of agencies, includes the relative ease with which this key 
group of agencies could be identified as well as the small number of entities that would 
need to be involved to effect meaningful change. Global organizations as well as U.S. 
importers indicate that agencies with health-related responsibilities (including consumer 
protection, agriculture, sanitary, and phytosanitary) have more requirements and “play a 
more prominent role with importers than others.”149 For example, COAC respondents to 
a 2014 Trade Efficiency Survey indicated that “the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Federal Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC) were the [partner government agencies] regulating most of their 
shipments.”150 In addition, some agencies have a focused regulatory control on certain 
                                                 
148 Ibid., 4. 
149 “2014 COAC Trade Efficiency Survey,” CBP, 7.  
150 Ibid. 
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industry sectors (such as automotive, pharmaceuticals, electronics, and textiles), making 
them good candidates for developing tailored approaches to improve import processing in 
their areas of responsibility. Survey data from the World Trade Organization supports 
and augments the COAC respondents’ perspective. In their Integrated Trade Intelligence 
Portal, the World Trade Organization provides country-specific snapshots of the most 
problematic non-tariff barriers to trade. Data from this portal indicates that, for the last 
decade, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements have remained the most 
significant of the barriers impacting U.S. imports, although the trend is moving 
downward, from a high of 208 SPS non-tariff measures identified in 2007 to a low of 
twenty-nine in 2015.151 This suggests that the most problematic non-tariff barriers have 
the potential to be addressed by the relatively small number of government agencies with 
responsibilities and requirements in those areas. Compared to the forty-seven agencies 
initially involved in the broader Single Window, a focused reform initiative involving 
CBP, USDA, FDA, and CPSC could develop tailored solutions to identified supply chain 
pain points and thereby more readily reach a “tipping point” after which meaningful 
outputs are made.  
An additional advantage of this tailored approach is that it focuses resources and 
efforts on improvements to the several additional border administration indicators that 
rely most on active engagement from agencies other than CBP, and therefore would raise 
scores across both evaluative criteria. In particular, each of the four sub-indicators in the 
“effectiveness and efficiency of the clearance process” (to include advance information, 
post-clearance audits, authorized economic operators, and transparency/information 
availability) category can provide commercially meaningful benefits to trade and 
strengthen government compliance controls only if all the relevant agencies have 
accomplished the necessary modernization steps. The example of the “advance 
information” indicator is illustrative. While CBP may allow importers to provide advance 
information so that shipments could be reviewed and potentially released prior to arriving 
at a domestic port, the facilitative benefit will not be realized by traders if another agency 
                                                 
151 “Table by Members—United States (2005-2015),” World Trade Organization, December 31, 
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that regulates that same shipment does not have similar procedures. If focused on 
addressing this problem with just a subset of the most relevant agencies (again, those that 
regulate the most trade or that heavily regulate trade in certain industries), CBP could 
leverage capabilities currently available at the Commercial Targeting and Analysis 
Center (CTAC) in Washington, DC. At present, the eleven federal agencies with 
representatives at CBP’s CTAC have access to advance manifest information that would 
otherwise be unavailable to them.152 While the current focus of the CTAC is “to 
streamline and enhance federal efforts to address import safety issues,” the mandate 
could be expanded to facilitate interagency information sharing among key agencies in 
support of coordinated risk-assessment across a broader array of industry sectors.153 Such 
coordination would help resolve one of the common areas of frustration expressed by 
importers: government “holding” of cargo at the border and subsequent release without 
any adverse action.154 The point is not that the industry desires additional penalties, but 
that the low ratio of “holds” to enforcement actions by the government is indicative of 
faulty, or perhaps non-existent, risk management procedures.  
An adherence to global entity and product identification elements by a subset of 
specific agencies also could achieve a tipping point of improvements in certain industries. 
The mechanisms currently used by agencies to identify imported entities or products for 
the purposes of targeting and admissibility decisions are not harmonized across agencies. 
For example, the Importer of Record (IOR) and Manufacturer’s Identification Number 
(MID) are both used by a variety of U.S. agencies to identify stakeholders involved in the 
importation process, while the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes and other entry 
                                                 
152 “Commercial Targeting and Analysis Center Celebrates 5 Years,” CBP, May 15, 2015, 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/commercial-targeting-and-analysis-center-
celebrates-5-years. 
153 “Commercial Targeting and Analysis Center (CTAC),” CBP, April 25, 2017, 
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority-issues/import-safety/ctac. 
154 One COAC Trade Survey found that “the vast majority of respondents indicated that none of their 
partner government agencies holds during 2013 resulted in an enforcement action.” “2014 COAC Trade 
Efficiency Survey,” CBP, 8. 
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data are used to identify products.155 As a result, the trade community may have to 
provide multiple data elements in order to identify a single entity or product, and agency 
efforts to coordinate government actions on a particular shipment are complicated by the 
use of non-standardized identifiers. In their 2011 report, the U.S. Product Identification 
Committee assessed the business case for businesses and government agencies’ use of the 
fourteen-digit Global Trade Item Number (GTIN) for determining the admissibility of 
specific products. In the case of toy and game products regulated by the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, the net value was estimated to be nearly $15 million, with 
total implementation costs of less than $1 million after five years if the top ten toy 
importers were to begin using global identification and classification codes.156 Similarly, 
the report estimated a seven-to-one benefit-to-cost ratio if the cut flower trade (regulated 
in part by the Animal Plant Health Inspection Service) were to use global classification 
codes to identify flower products in entries rather than current proprietary codes. These 
findings suggest that measurable reductions in processing costs and times for certain 
imports can be realized through tailored reforms undertaken by a relatively few number 
of agencies.  
As noted previously, the activities detailed in each of the sub-indexes in the 
border administration category, other than the “customs service index,” require extensive 
coordination, collaboration, and perhaps even integration among the forty-seven agencies 
with responsibilities for controlling cross-border trade. Because the tailored approach 
detailed in policy option 2 would allow for significant improvements in at least the 
“effectiveness/efficiency of the clearance process,” the scores for this first evaluative 
criterion would improve to nineteen. Further, the option scores would increase on certain 
aspects of the second evaluation criterion, which asks if the policy would provide 
improvements that could address COAC recommendations focused on trade facilitation. 
                                                 
155 ITDS Product Information Committee, “Guidance for Using E-Commerce Data to Manage 
Product Admission at International Borders,” ITDS, October 2010, 
http://itds.gov/linkhandler/itds/tsn/product_ 
info_comm/guidance.pdf. 
156 ITDS Product Information Committee, “The Business Case for Using E-Commerce Data at 
International Borders,” ITDS, December 2011, 
http://itds.gov/linkhandler/itds/tsn/product_info_comm/businesscase.pdf.  
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In particular, it would address recommendations across all four categories, and therefore 
receives a total score of four.157 
2. Challenges 
A reform initiative involving a subset of key agencies geared toward identifying a 
particular set of supply chain pain points that, if addressed, could achieve a “tipping 
point” depends absolutely on the commitment, close coordination, and possible 
delegation of authority among those key agencies.  
The executive order Streamlining Export and Import Processes for Americas’ 
Businesses established new mechanisms for this coordination and enumerated near- and 
long-term strategic outcomes for the project overall. The relationships, organizations, and 
processes established throughout the initial years of the Single Window effort are strong 
foundations for the efforts envisioned in policy option 2, particularly Executive Order 
13659’s establishment of the Border Interagency Executive Council (BIEC) in 2014.158 
The mandate of the BIEC was not to oversee the technical development of the Single 
Window system or ensure appropriate legal frameworks, but rather to “develop policies 
and processes to enhance collaboration across customs and … agencies with border 
management authorities and responsibilities to measurably improve supply chain 
processes and improve the identification of illicit shipments.”159 As explained in a 
Homeland Security article written by the author, 
The Executive Order set expectations for the types of enhanced process 
interdependencies that the BIEC should work to implement. These include 
things like developing a common set of risk management principles and 
methods to improve collaboration among agencies and consistency for 
businesses importing and exporting goods. In addition, the Executive 
Order requires the BIEC to find ways to better orchestrate government 
activities at the border, re-engineer current operational processes, and re-
                                                 
157 See Appendix Table 13, “Criterion 2: Benefit to U.S. Businesses.”  
158 The functions of the BIEC are detailed in Barack Obama, Executive Order—Streamlining the 
Export/Import Process for America’s Businesses (Executive Order 13659) (Washington, DC: the White 
House, 2014), Section 5, 3–4. 
159 Obama, Executive Order—Streamlining the Export/Import Process, Section 4, 3.  
 71 
think existing policies to achieve improved service outcomes for 
businesses.160  
While the BIEC provides an established forum for interagency discussion and 
empowers DHS with the designation of chair, certain factors limit the group’s power and 
effectiveness and hinder CBP’s ability to set the future agenda and maintain necessary 
momentum. First and foremost, the BIEC lacks the statutory authority given to other 
interagency governance structures and therefore has little means to adjudicate areas of 
conflict that inevitably arise among agencies or ensure continued fiscal support from key 
players. As a matter of law, the Department of Treasury is responsible for overseeing the 
development of the Single Window and ensuring the coordinated involvement of all 
relevant agencies. Section 405 of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 
2006 established this Treasury-led governance structure while at the same time requiring 
CBP to develop, operate, and maintain the technical foundation of the Single Window.161 
The BIEC is responsible for providing strategic leadership and policy direction for a 
broader U.S. government campaign of coordinated border management that would be 
enabled by the automated capabilities available upon completion of the Single Window. 
The establishment of the BIEC did reflect commitment at the highest levels of 
government to the reform effort, a key factor in light of the fact that “political will is 
ranked consistently as one of the top success factors for a single window project in most 
of the global guidelines” available on the topic.162  
However, this bifurcated governance structure could complicate an effort 
requiring “a remarkable amount of coordination and collaboration among dozens of 
agencies, each with different missions, requirements, and budgets.”163 The current 
governance structure of the BIEC also presents challenges in its lack of a mechanism to 
leverage the expertise of private-sector stakeholders. While many agencies, including 
CBP, have advisory councils comprising representatives across affected industries, the 
                                                 
160 Brzozowski, “E Pluribus Unum.” 
161 The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act, P.L. No. 109-347, 2006, Sec 405. 
162 Brzozowski, “E Pluribus Unum.” Examples of these global guidelines include UN/CEFACT, 
Recommendation No. 33; World Customs Organization, How to Build A Single Window Environment. 
163 Brzozowski, “The United States’ Single Window.” 
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BIEC does not yet have a formal means to solicit and receive such input. This deficiency 
represents a serious challenge for the BIEC, as close public and private-sector 
engagement during a time of reform and modernization would benefit both sides. 
Guidance from the World Customs Organization, the World Trade Organization, and 
other relevant international bodies supports this view. A stronger and more effective 
BIEC would therefore require some modest amount of additional DHS authorities and 
funding, or alternatively the means by which DHS (as the chair) could influence or even 
compel the engagement of the key agencies needed to reach identified “tipping 
points.”164 
The overall evaluation criteria scores for policy option 2 are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6.   Policy Option 2 Evaluation 









1 Status Quo 11 1 Easy 
2 Tailored Modernization 19 2 Hard  
3 Shifting the Paradigm    
 
  
                                                 
164 See Appendix Figure 13, “Criterion 3: Feasibility of Implementation.” 
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C. POLICY OPTION 3: SHIFTING THE PARADIGM  
DHS, by shedding some technical responsibilities and obtaining increased 
authorities as chair of the BIEC, can lead a U.S. government-wide program of 
coordinated border management to achieve an economy-wide vision of improved national 
economic security.  
As discussed throughout this paper, the new automated capabilities provided by 
the Single Window have the potential to improve U.S. border management processes by 
providing the technical foundation for enhanced data sharing and better coordination 
among the dozens of agencies with border-related authorities and needs. By receiving 
accurate and timely electronic data, U.S. government agencies could orchestrate reviews, 
develop common risk-management policies and targeting systems, and leverage each 
other’s expertise and resources at the border. These improvements could not only 
strengthen government agencies’ ability to ensure compliance with U.S. import laws, but 
accelerate government decision-making time for releasing goods—from days to 
minutes—and dramatically speed the flow of secure and legitimate commerce across our 
borders. If implemented with vision and efficiency, the improvements have the potential 
to transform the way DHS and the U.S. government manage the flow of commerce across 
our border and strengthen both our national and economic security.  
However, as previously suggested by this thesis author in Homeland Security,  
Effective management of such a complex, multifaceted project promises to 
be challenging. Industry experts have expressed concerns with the uneven 
pace of different U.S. Government agencies’ transition to electronic and 
automated processes and have cautioned that the diversity of current risk 
management cultures and inspection [requirements] may complicate 
efforts to streamline operations at the border.165 
In fact, as discussed previously in this chapter, approximately 38 percent of the 
recommendations provided by the Commercial Operations Advisory Council (CBP’s 
trade advisory group) are geared toward improvements that can be made not by CBP but 
by the range of other government agencies with controls over imports. While CBP’s 
                                                 
165 Brzozowski, “E Pluribus Unum.” 
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program of trade modernization and reform, its strong enforcement authorities, and its 
physical presence at hundreds of domestic ports of entry make it “the gatekeeper of the 
state and embodiment of its sovereignty at the border,” the agency and even the broader 
Department cannot alone effect meaningful trade facilitation improvements.166 In 
particular, CBP’s responsibility for building, operating, and maintaining a digital 
platform as complex and vital as the Single Window is troublesome when viewed in light 
of the U.S. government’s track record for successful execution of such long-term and 
technically sophisticated activities. Examples of public-sector limitations in this area 
abound, to the extent that the Government Accountability Office recently added the 
general category of “Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations” to its high-risk 
program list.167 According to the General Accountability Office’s 2015 report,  
Although the executive branch has undertaken numerous initiatives to 
better manage the more than $80 billion that is annually invested in 
information technology (IT), federal IT investments too frequently fail or 
incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to 
mission-related outcomes.168 
The Single Window project is not included specifically as an example of an “at risk” IT 
acquisitions and operations program. However, the fact that the Single Window serves as 
the backbone of the nation’s cross-border trading system does raise questions concerning 
the private sector’s expertise and resources, which might be better leveraged to assist 
with the endeavor.  
 
                                                 
166 Mariya Polner, “Coordinated Border Management: From Theory to Practice,” World Customs 
Journal 5, no. 2 (September 2011): 50. 
167 Government Accountability Office (GAO), High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, 
While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others (GAO-17-317) (Washington, DC: GAO, 2017), 1, 
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1. Introducing Policy Option 3  
As a quick review, policy option 2 suggested that certain tipping points of 
efficiency could be reached through the concerted action of a relatively small number of 
agencies working to eliminate industry-specific barriers to trade. Again, the 
distinguishing factor of policy option 2 is its selectivity in prioritizing certain non-tariff 
barriers that, if addressed, would most likely effect the tipping point necessary for 
consequential change. While producing better scores than policy option for both 
“efficiency/effectiveness of the import process” (first criterion) and “benefits to business” 
(second criterion), policy option 2 did not deviate far from the current decentralized 
approach, in which one government agency (i.e., CBP) builds and operates the Single 
Window under the oversight of another government entity (the Department of Treasury) 
that services dozens of different government agencies as well as hundreds of thousands of 
business users, and must evolve at the break-neck speed of global trade. 
Under policy option 3, dubbed “shifting the paradigm,” DHS would seek to 
institute a broader agenda of reform by leading U.S. government efforts to centralize and 
prioritize current trade facilitation efforts to rationalize activities across the spectrum of 
strategic goals, policy development, and programmatic implementation. The 
distinguishing factor here is that policies and activities across the trade facilitation space 
would be prioritized by and oriented toward the achievement of a unifying, economy-
wide vision of desired performance outcomes. To effect such an approach, DHS would 
first work to divest itself of the responsibilities to maintain and operate the Single 
Window through new partnerships with private-sector experts. DHS would then work to 
obtain expanded authorities to strengthen its role as the chair of the BIEC while situating 
that interagency body within the National Trade Facilitation Committee process, an 
established framework for strategic U.S. policymaking. With this new imprimatur, DHS 
could drive a new program of collective action among a group of U.S. government 
agencies that have specific responsibilities to ensure the security of goods at the border 
and their compliance with national laws. This will require a paradigm shift away from the 
current decentralized model of government control, in which agencies understandably 
prioritize efforts to advance their individual missions and make admissibility decisions on 
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cargo based on varying risk-management cultures and resource levels. Instead, DHS will 
work to institute common principles, policies, and practices at the border among relevant 
agencies, toward the ultimate goal of implementing the strategic direction provided by 
the National Trade Facilitation Committee. To accomplish this, DHS would look to 
emulate two key lessons offered by the Government of Singapore in its development of a 
national single window system called TradeNet. In particular, DHS would seek to obtain 
the highest level of political commitment to a stated, if aspirational, strategic objective 
and then work to incorporate the private-sector technical expertise and resources to 
support future operations and maintenance of the Single Window system. Such an 
approach would allow DHS and other government agencies to identify the national 
economic security policy outcomes desired and prioritize supportive implementation 
activities while relaying divesting the technical operation of the complex Single Window 
to private-sector experts.  
The key elements of policy option 3 include:  
• Governance Structures: DHS will work to institutionalize the BIEC as the 
United States’ National Trade Facilitation Committee required under 
Article 23.2 of the World Trade Organization’s trade facilitation 
agreement.169 This would differ from current practice, in which several 
interagency bodies chaired and administered by the Office of the USTR 
fulfill the functions of the required National Trade Facilitation Committee. 
This modified governance structure will enable the USTR’s existing trade 
policy coordination groups to focus on “developing and coordinating U.S. 
Government positions on international trade and trade-related investment 
issues,” and establishing domestic performance goals for the United 
States.170 The BIEC, serving as the National Trade Facilitation 
Committee, will then be responsible for developing the necessary policies 
and programs to achieve implementation and for managing government-
wide performance toward the stated strategic goals. DHS and the BIEC 
will be better positioned to design and oversee the implementation of a 
“policy with an economy-wide vision” than the current approach, in which 
                                                 
169 Article 23.2 of the World Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement requires that “each 
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decentralized agencies with varying requirements often complicate efforts 
to make coordinated progress toward agreed-upon goals.171 In turn, as 
required by law, the Department of Treasury will be responsible for 
“overseeing the implementation of, and participation in, the International 
Trade Data System,” including defining and periodically updating “the 
standard set of data elements to be collected, stored, and shared in the 
[International Trade Data System (ITDS)].”172 
• Performance Targets: DHS will work with the USTR and the Department 
of Commerce to develop and regularly monitor progress toward U.S. 
strategic-level trade facilitation performance targets to be realized through 
the Single Window, and associated modernization efforts over the 
subsequent five years. These performance targets could be based on the 
strategic vision and goals agreed to under the World Trade Organization’s 
trade facilitation agreement, or a subset of objectives identified as 
priorities by the current administration.173 The Executive Office of the 
President will monitor the aggregate impact of all agency efforts toward 
meeting the performance targets on a regular (bi-annual) basis and compel 
re-doubled attention as necessary through directed budget allocations. By 
focusing on outcome-oriented performance targets, agencies will be 
influenced to follow the example set by CBP’s recent modernization 
reform effort, which included a shift to the concepts of informed 
compliance, and shared responsibility and a utilization of risk-
management and post-audit practices that minimize delays at the border.  
• Role of the Private Sector: DHS, acknowledging the public sector’s 
limitations in building and managing a digital platform as complex and 
dynamic as the national Single Window, will seek to augment the role of 
the private sector dramatically. DHS will institute a two-tiered public–
private partnership arrangement, in which businesses and other private-
sector entities will have expanded and institutionalized roles in advising 
on economy-wide strategic outcomes and subsequent policy development 
and implementation to achieve such outcomes. According to one relevant 
global organization, the “experience of many countries has shown that 
identifying trade issues and priorities can best be achieved through a 
dialogue between Government and the trading community.”174 In 
addition, DHS will consider opportunities to divest itself of current 
responsibilities to build and operate the Single Window by exploring 
solutions through which private-sector expertise and resources might be 
leveraged. This could include the use of “open-source challenges” for 
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development of new parts of the system, as suggested by some experts, the 
provision of “grants and other financial assistance to the first group of 
companies willing to participate in the newly established system” as 
suggested by others, or the establishment of a corporate vehicle that has 
the “necessary capital to develop and operate the system … that 
essentially performs a regulatory function for the government.”175  
• Political Will. DHS will work to obtain the support and endorsement of 
the new administration for the continuation of Single Window efforts, the 
establishment of the new governance structure proposed in this option, and 
the necessary funding to support transition of the Single Window technical 
build to a private-sector entity for maintenance. Such an endorsement can 
be made available through any type of executive action that does not 
conflict with existing law, and would support continued momentum by 
focusing leadership attention and agency budgets on the issue.  
2. An Overview of the Singapore Model  
Constructing border management policies and measures that achieve the delicate 
balance between trade facilitation and trade security is a difficult task for any nation. 
Singapore’s consistent top ranking in the World Bank’s “trading across border” index 
(first place from 2008–2015) may at first suggest that the nation has found ways to 
achieve this balance.176 However, as Singapore is a large transshipment hub (meaning 
large volumes of goods pass through the port but little is imported or exported by 
Singapore itself), the addition of four new “compliance” criteria to the World Bank’s 
scoring methodology provides a more accurate view. As can be seen in Figure 10, 
Singapore’s 2016 ranking in this category dropped to forty-one, well behind even the 
lowest U.S. score over the last decade. While these data suggest that Singapore may not 
be pursing the dual goals of trade facilitation and security as aggressively as the United 
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Our Economic Competitiveness (Ottawa: Canadian Council of Chief Executives, December, 2014), 13, 
http://thebusinesscouncil.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Made-in-North-America-paper-Nov-2014-
FINAL-2-Dec-20141.pdf; Jonathan Koh, “Towards a Single Window Trading Environment: Singapore’s 
TradeNet,” CrimsonLogic, accessed June 18, 2017, 9, 15, http://www.crimsonlogic.com/Documents/pdf/ 
resourceLibrary/viewPoint/Towards%20a%20SW%20Environment-SG%20TradeNet.pdf. 
176 The World Bank produces annual Doing Business reports that score and rank nations according to 
ten criteria: 1) Starting a Business; 2) Dealing with Construction Permits; 3) Getting Electricity; 4) 
Registering Property; 5) Getting Credit; 6) Protecting Minority Investors; 7) Paying Taxes; 8) Trading 
Across Borders; 9) Enforcing Contracts; and, 10) Resolving Insolvency. Most relevant to this paper is the 
“trading across borders” ranking. The most recent report and report archives can be found at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2017.  
 79 
States, the fact that it places a premium on facilitation may be helpful nonetheless by 
highlighting key lessons in this space worthy of emulation. In particular, a brief 
assessment of the factors contributing to the development of Singapore’s TradeNet could 
inform U.S. efforts associated with the Single Window. 
 
Figure 10.  World Bank “Trading across Borders” Rankings, United States and 
Singapore (2006–2016)177 
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Singapore’s challenging history and complete dependence on international trade 
were key motivating factors in the development of TradeNet. From its founding as a 
British colonial trading port in 1819, Singapore overcome its lack of natural resources by 
leveraging its strategic location between China and India to attract traders seeking 
alternatives to Dutch-owned ports in Southeast Asia. This strategic location and deep 
water access has fostered the development of the Port of Singapore into the one of the 
world’s largest transshipment hubs, through which goods from over 600 ports in 123 
countries transit.178 In 1959, Singapore became self-governing, and in 1963 joined a 
federation of other newly independent states to form Malaysia. After a period of friction, 
Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965 and became an independent republic. The 
nation then experienced several years of social and political turmoil and economic 
decline in the aftermath of World War II. High unemployment (up to 13.5 percent at its 
worst), damaged infrastructures and housing, limited sources of potable water, and a 
growing population all contributed to the unrest. Forced to gain access to critical foreign 
markets for resources, and with a society desperate for stability and jobs, Singapore 
became an early advocate of globalization.179  
Singapore’s impressive turnaround since World War II can be credited to efficient 
government policies and a single-minded commitment to achieving power and autonomy 
through economic growth. Singapore is a unitary state with no local governments that 
operates under a unicameral parliamentary system composed of eighty-one elected 
members. The People’s Action Party (PAP), the dominant political party since its 
ascension to power in 1959, has governed on a “social contract” platform geared toward 
the single goal of making Singapore a safe, stable, open, and thereby attractive country 
for investors.180 The benefits of this platform were apparent in the government’s 
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commitment to developing TradeNet. In addition to focusing significant attention on 
updating the relevant trade regulations and other legal frameworks, the government 
created the Economic Development Board in 1961 to oversee and fund the initial stages 
of TradeNet’s development.181 The use of the Board in the TradeNet project allowed the 
Singapore Customs Service to maintain its position as the lead government ministry but 
defer technical aspects of the system’s construction to private-sector experts. In addition, 
the model allowed private-sector entities to fund the upfront costs of the project and 
recoup the investment through a user fee arrangement.182 The public–private model used 
in the particular instance of TradeNet allowed Singapore to move from project 
conception to launch in the amazingly short timeframe of only three years. Subsequently, 
Singapore transferred TradeNet entirely to the private-sector company CrimsonLogic for 
operations and maintenance. After fully implementing TradeNet, Singapore realized a 
reduction in the turnaround time for processing of typical trade documents, from two to 
four days to as little as fifteen minutes, and reduced documentation processing costs by 
approximately 20 percent.183 The Singapore government has since mandated the 
electronic submission of all trade documentation through TradeNet, and the system now 
processes an estimated 9 million trade documents a year. The United States does not 
share many of the same historical, geographic, political, and economic factors that 
informed the Singapore experience. However, the model provided by Singapore in the 
case of TradeNet is insightful, particularly the continued commitment from the highest 
levels of government to specific economic outcomes and the utilization of private-sector 
expertise to build and then maintain the TradeNet system.  
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3. Advantages  
Policy option 3, “Shifting the Paradigm,” enjoys a number of advantages. First 
and foremost, as the dominant concept of the option is to centralize and streamline the 
variety of organizations and efforts focused on trade facilitation goals in the United 
States, it follows that much groundwork has already been laid. Therefore, one of the key 
advantages of this option is that its implementation by DHS and key partners from other 
agencies can benefit from building upon an established foundation of existing bodies and 
ongoing activities. For example, the interagency governance structures detailed 
previously are all chartered bodies with established members and regular meeting 
schedules. These groups include the Trade Policy Review Group and the supporting staff 
structure called the Trade Policy Staff Committee.184 The USTR administers both 
interagency bodies, which together “constitute the principal mechanism for developing 
and coordinating U.S. Government positions on international trade and trade-related 
investment issues.”185 The staff-level group includes approximately twenty agencies, 
meets several times annually, and is supported by numerous sub-groups focused on 
addressing non-tariff barriers encountered within specific industry supply chains. In 
addition to the Trade Policy Review Group, the BIEC and the ITDS Board of Directors 
also represent existing interagency bodies focused on specific aspects of trade facilitation. 
Both bodies, as discussed previously, have either authority deriving from law or 
executive action and are chartered entities that have focused recent efforts on the 
development and coordinated agency use of the Single Window.  
Finally, the National Trade Facilitation Committee required under Article 23.2 of 
the World Trade Organization trade facilitation agreement exists currently under 
interagency structures within the USTR. This policy option does propose a modification 
to the current arrangement in that it would designate the BIEC as the National Trade 
Facilitation Committee and make it responsible for performing the required functions. 
(See Figures 11 and 12 for a comparison of the current and proposed governance 
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structures proposed under policy option 3.) The fact that the BIEC is an established 
interagency body already performing an array of trade facilitation functions suggests that 
this re-designation from USTR to the BIEC could be seamless if approved at senior levels 
of government. Such a transition would require the BIEC to update its founding charter 
but would not require new legal or regulatory authorities. The fact that the BIEC 
currently lacks statutory authority, one of the disadvantages discussed in policy option 2, 
would be overcome in this case by ensuring that it received strategic direction from, and 
was accountable to, the Trade Policy Review Group.186 That body could serve as the 
forum in which to resolve conflicts among agencies that could not be resolved within the 
BIEC. In short, policy option 3 has the advantage of rationalizing existing governance 
structure associated with trade facilitation goals that today engender duplication of effort 
at best, and at worst missed opportunities resulting from bureaucratic disorganization. 
 
Figure 11.  Current U.S. Government Interagency Bodies Focused on Trade 
Facilitation (Imports) 
                                                 
186 As noted previously, the BIEC was established by Executive Order 13659, Streamlining the 
Export/Import Process for America’s Businesses. 
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Figure 12.  Policy Option 3 Proposed Modifications to U.S. Government 
Interagency Bodies Focused on Trade Facilitation (Imports) 
Another advantage offered by the proposals under policy option 3 is that the 
modified governance structure will promote the prioritization of policy and program 
development and regulatory reform to address non-tariff trade barriers deemed most 
problematic to overall U.S. economic interests. The Trade Policy Review Group would 
not only ensure that the United States spoke with a unified voice during trade 
negotiations in the international arena, but would provide much-needed “commander’s 
intent” to the BIEC, the body responsible for ensuring that U.S. domestic policies, 
activities, and authorities are in place to achieve the desired performance outcomes 
without unduly impacting the flows of legitimate goods. This would address the key 
disadvantages of the current de-centralized approach, in which various agencies 
understandably prioritize efforts that advance individual missions with little to no 
understanding of how the aggregate impact of their efforts impact broader U.S. trade 
goals. For example, while the U.S. government has a strong process in place to vet, 
understand the costs and benefits of, and seek public comment on proposed regulations, 
complications remain in assessing the aggregate impact of these regulations as agencies, 
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and even the Office of Management and Budget, examine them with an eye for the 
impact on their own equities, and according to their own parochial interests.187 In 
addition to promoting enhanced coordination of regulatory actions associated with cross-
border trade, the Trade Policy Review Group in this policy option will direct the BIEC to 
develop policies geared toward achieving necessary tipping points in certain industry 
sectors or to address an identified subset of non-tariff barriers. This approach was part of 
the “tailored solution” offered under policy option 2, but has the added advantage of 
being directly informed by national-level goals and desired outcomes rather than an 
approach that seeks to tackle only the most obvious issues (the low-hanging fruit). 
Guidance provided by UN/CEFACT supports the view that the National Trade 
Facilitation Body function be established firmly “within a Government’s overall national 
trade policy framework.”188 In its recommendations on the development of such bodies, 
the Centre elaborates on the responsibilities of such a body to: 
Devise a strategy that offers a holistic approach to national trade 
facilitation activities including coordination at a policy level, the 
development of trade simplification measures and proposals for action 
plans. The National Trade Facilitation Body can present this strategy to 
the relevant government institutions for endorsement, for support and in 
order to obtain a mandate for implementation of the strategy.189 
In this regard, policy option 3 offers the most promising means to positively 
impact the effectiveness and efficiency of overall import procedures (the first evaluation 
criterion). While the scores of the customs service index within the border administration 
category would not change, the new governance structure would promote adoption of 
modern trade facilitation practices such as post-clearance audits and authorized economic 
operator programs by agencies other than CBP. Because of this, and the expected 
resulting reductions in the time, cost, and documents required to import goods, the score 
for this evaluation criterion is twenty-three, the highest of the three policy options.  
                                                 
187 For additional information on the requirements for U.S. agency development of regulations, see 
William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review (Washington, DC: the White 
House, 1993), and Barack Obama, Executive Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review 
(Washington, DC: the White House, 2011).  
188 UN/CEFACT, Recommendation No. 4, 1. 
189 Ibid. 
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A third advantage of policy option 3 is that it will seek to better leverage untapped 
expertise and resources from private-sector stakeholders in the development of not only 
U.S. national-level economic strategic objectives, but in the creation of the policy, 
programs, and infrastructures necessary to achieve the desired outcomes. As discussed 
previously, policy option 3 proposes that DHS institute a two-tiered, public–private 
partnership arrangement in which businesses and other private-sector entities have 
institutionalized roles in: 1) advising on economy-wide strategic outcomes and 
subsequent policy development and implementation to achieve such outcomes, and 
2) supporting the daily maintenance and operation of the Single Window. Noted supply 
chain and logistics expert Mariya Polner provides helpful insights on the global guidance 
available regarding the “continuum of inter-governmental integration” that, according to 
policy option 3, can helpfully be used as a model for successful public–private 
partnerships with regard to management of the Single Window and participation in 
broader trade facilitation policy development.190 Polner distinguishes levels of 
cooperation that include collaboration, “a more intensive process, sometimes involving a 
formal partnership,” and the less intensive coordination, which involves “formalized 
meetings and exchanges of information so that the organizations involved can achieve 
their respective goals more effectively.”191 Although Polner is commenting on the means 
by which different border agencies might move toward improved collaboration, the 
terminology is applicable to the increased formality of meetings and exchanges among 
agencies and private-sector stakeholders proposed under policy option 3.192  
By working collaboratively with other agencies and the private sector, DHS could 
better achieve common objectives that might be difficult to realize in isolation. This 
increase in “horizontal” collaboration is hailed by some management experts as an 
effective approach to overcoming obstacles in complex environments. “The most 
                                                 
190 Polner, “Coordinated Border Management,” 53.  
191 Ibid. 
192 World Customs Organization, Customs in the 21st Century: Enhancing Growth and Development 
through Trade Facilitation and Border Security (Brussels: World Customs Organization, 2008); World 
Customs Organization, Background Paper to Facilitate the Discussion on Coordinated Border 
Management (Brussels: WCO Inter-Agency Forum on Coordinated Border Management, 2009); World 
Bank, Customs Modernization Handbook (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005). 
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significant constrains to cross-organizational workings,” one recent work suggests, “is 
embedded bureaucratic cultures and reified everyday practices—means of administration 
which have been transformed into ends”; to overcome such challenges, organizations 
must “understand that outcomes are the goal,” and “learn to work horizontally and 
construct ways and means of getting there over time.”193 The placement of the BIEC 
within the framework of the more strategic-level Trade Policy Review Group would help 
ensure that the former is able to avail itself of the private-sector expertise available to the 
latter. The Trade Policy Review Group has an established and effective means of 
obtaining private-sector input and recommendations, through the publication of proposals 
for public comment in the Federal Register, an advisory committee system that includes 
hundreds of experts from specialized industries, and the capacity to conduct public 
hearings.194 As the private sector becomes more involved in the early identification of 
economy-wide priorities and development of policy and programmatic solutions to 
achieve agreed-upon outcomes, one would expect that businesses would be impacted 
positively. Supply chain expert Andrew Grainger highlights the benefits of a close 
dialogue between public and private stakeholders throughout border management and 
modernization reform efforts. Such dialogue “encourages a climate of shared 
responsibility and ownership. It helps to set reform priorities, leading to initiatives that 
focus on the most desired outcomes.”195  
Private-sector expertise and resources would also be useful in supporting the 
future maintenance and operation of the Single Window. As discussed previously, the 
Government of Singapore relied upon a public–private partnership to develop its 
TradeNet system, thereby ensuring the input of both industry and government officials, 
and then successfully outsourced the system’s operation to a private entity called 
CrimsonLogic. While CrimsonLogic charges user fees for transactions, other models in 
                                                 
193 Elizabeth Eppel et al., “The Cross-organizational Collaboration Solution,” in Crossing Boundaries 
in Public Management and Policy, eds. Janine O’Flynn, Deborah Blackman, and John Halligan (New 
York: Routledge, 2014).  
194 USTR, 2017 Trade Policy, 201.  
195 Andrew Grainger, “The Role of the Private Sector in Border Management Reform,” in Border 
Management Modernization, edited by Gerard McLinden et al. (Washington, DC: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2011), 159.  
 88 
which the government covers the costs of outsourcing operations and maintenance could 
be considered by DHS and other agencies. Such an approach could help ensure that the 
system development is able to keep pace with the rapid evolution of IT capabilities as 
well as new requirements that inevitably arise in today’s dynamic trade environment. 
This would address current challenges that arise when CBP and other agencies seek to 
accommodate new IT and regulatory requirements within the constraints of long-term 
budget cycles, legacy systems, and government salaries that cannot compete with the 
public sector. Because policy option 3 provides the most collaborative approach for a 
public–private relationship during the policy development as well as program 
implementation phases, it represents the best means by which industry could focus 
attention and influence change on the 47 percent of recommendations provided by the 
COAC to DHS between 2013 and 2016 (the second evaluation criterion).196 
4. Challenges  
The key challenge in policy option 3 is the fact that many agencies with border 
responsibilities do not share CBP’s legal basis and established policy to promote trade 
facilitation as an affirmative objective, in addition to their respective enforcement and 
security missions. As a result, CBP may find it difficult to drive a modernization agenda 
focused on facilitation among other departments and agencies focused exclusively on 
ensuring enforcement of relevant laws. Several laws establish and reaffirm CBP’s trade 
facilitation and enforcement mission, including the Security and Accountability for Every 
(SAFE) Port Act and the more recent Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 
2015. Specifically, the SAFE Port Act includes several provisions focused on facilitation, 
including: the establishment of a public–private partnership program “to facilitate the 
movement of secure cargo through the international supply chain,” the establishiment of 
a director of trade policy position to “promote trade facilitation on a department-wide 
basis,” the creation of the International Trade Committee to advise on trade facilitation 
functions, the inclusion of “facilitating trade” among the priority trade functions of CBP, 
and requirements for CBP to seek to “align customs procedures globally in order to 
                                                 
196 See Appendix Table 13, “Criterion 2: Benefit to U.S. Businesses,” for the scores of each policy 
option according to trade facilitation recommendations from the COAC. 
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facilitate the efficient flow of international trade.”197 Additionally, the Trade Facilitation 
and Trade Enforcement Act contains numerous references to “the expedited release of 
cargo” and “facilitating the flow of legitimate trade” as distinct from the trade 
enforcement/revenue collection mission, which requires establishing among the duties of 
the commissioner the requirement to “facilitate and expedite the flow of legitimate 
travelers and trade.”198 Even as the co-chair of the BIEC, DHS may have difficulty in 
implementing an aggressive trade facilitation agenda unless the array of other 
departments with equities receive unequivocal policy direction from the highest levels in 
the White House or new legal mandates to achieve their enforcement mission according 
to prescribed efficiency targets. Analysts from the Congressional Research Service 
suggested that one approach to overcoming this challenge would be “to require other 
agencies to work more closely with CBP at various stages of the trade enforcement 
process,” or “delegate additional enforcement powers to CBP.”199 However, the obvious 
shortcomings of this approach would be the potential for this to “dilute the enforcement 
authority of other federal agencies, undermining their own missions.”200 A recent 
publication from the World Customs Organization sums up the challenges associated 
with any reform program requiring collective action among a group of diverse agencies 
with varying cultures and responsibilities at the border. “The most difficult part is not 
really defining the concept [of coordinated border management],” the WCO notes, “but 
rather implementing it, whether on its own or by coupling it to the introduction of a 
national trade Single Window environment.201 The fact that other key departments and 
agencies do not have the same affirmative trade facilitation mission and legal authorities 
as CBP could complicate a coordinated, government-wide implementation. For this 
reason, the feasibility of this final option is assessed as “hard.”202 
                                                 
197 The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, P.L. No. 109-347, Sec. 211, 401, 
402, 403, 404. 
198 Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2016, P.L. 114-125, Sec. 103, 110, 802. 
199 Jones and Rosenblum, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 35. 
200 Ibid.  
201 World Customs Organization, “Dossier: Introduction,” WCO News, no. 76 (February 2015): 8, 
http://www.wcoomd.org/~/media/wco/public/global/pdf/media/wco-news-magazines/wco_news_76.pdf. 
202 See Appendix Figure 13, “Criterion 3: Feasibility of Implementation.” 
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The overall evaluation criteria scores for policy option 3 are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Policy Option 3 Evaluation 










1 Status Quo 11 2 Easy 
2 Tailored Modernization 19 4 Hard 
3 Shifting the Paradigm 23 4 Hard 
 
D. RECOMMENDED PATH FORWARD  
This paper proposed three distinct policy options by which DHS could better 
achieve its stated goal of pursuing both security and trade efficiency as mutual, rather 
than mutually exclusive, goals and contribute most to ensuring the nation’s economic 
security. Under policy option 1, “maintaining the status quo,” DHS would maintain its 
current risk-based and layered approach to ensuring both trade enforcement and trade 
facilitation while leading other agencies by its own example of modernization. Under 
policy option 2, DHS would lead a program of “tailored modernization” among a select 
group of agencies in which concerted effort would be focused on achieving tipping points 
that would help overcome specific non-tariff barriers in specific industry supply chains. 
And finally, under policy option 3, DHS would work to “shift the paradigm” toward a 
more centralized model of government controls of imports geared toward national 
strategic trade policy outcomes. Each option presents variations on the foundational 
theme, supported by relevant literature, that “trade facilitation measures have introduced 
new ways to fulfil the traditional mandates of border agencies, often making them more 
efficient and effective by rationalizing resource use.”203 Each option also builds in 
varying ways upon the traditional customs revenue collection role that CBP plays within 
                                                 
203 Moise, “Costs and Challenges of Implementing Trade Facilitation Measures,” 11. 
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DHS, as well as how DHS now or in the future could contribute to national economic 
security goals. And finally, this paper evaluated each option according to three evaluation 
criteria: 1) the impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of overall import procedures, 
2) the impacts on American businesses, and 3) the feasibility of implementing the policy.  
After detailing and evaluating each of the options, policy option 3 emerged as 
approach by which DHS would have the most potential to implement recent rhetoric and 
address the characteristics of the modern trade environment that, if left unaddressed, 
could weaken the United States’ economic security. As DHS has asserted that homeland 
security is “inseparable from economic security,” and affirming that part of its mission is 
to “enhance the Nation’s global economic competitiveness,” DHS bears responsibility for 
addressing these challenges and concerns.204 The distinguishing factor of policy option 3 
is that it provides a new governance structure that directly links economy-wide strategic 
objectives, developed by existing interagency trade policy bodies and informed by 
private-sector stakeholders, to direct the activities of the BIEC.  
Policy option 3 seeks to address the key disadvantage of maintaining the status 
quo (policy option 1), namely the fact that a continuation of the current decentralized 
approach to border management might actually degrade import processing service levels 
in the near term until agencies can coordinate the array of procedures and policies 
impacted by the new information technology communication systems like the Single 
Window. Researchers from the OECD advised nations seeking to improve coordination 
between customs and border agencies to be cautious of “choosing implementation tools 
before elaborating the relevant policies (for instance introducing computer networks 
before modernizing control and clearance procedures),” as such approaches may “run the 
risk of reducing available policy options and making subsequent changes lengthier and 
more costly.”205 Policy option 3 seeks to address this risk by proposing that DHS work to 
situate the BIEC that it chairs within an established trade policy–making network that 
could then develop common service standards with valuable input from the private 
sector. Orienting relevant policy development and implementation activities across the 
                                                 
204 DHS, 2014 QHSR, 31; CBP, Vision and Strategy 2020, 7. 
205 Moise, “Costs and Challenges of Implementing Trade Facilitation Measures,” 11.  
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interagency toward a common strategic performance goal requires other agencies to more 
rapidly adopt the modernization efforts already advanced by CBP. The difference in 
scores between option 3 and option 1 for the first evaluation criterion (efficiency of 
import processes) and the second evaluation criterion (benefits to U.S. businesses) results 
from the fact that option 3 requires improvements from the dozens of non-customs 
agencies whose requirements impact the processing of imported goods at the border. 
Additionally, option 3 provides the means by which DHS could better unlock the 
transformative potential of the newly developed Single Window as the chair of an 
empowered BIEC. Again, according to guidance from the OECD, “Single Windows are 
probably the most sophisticated instrument for ensuring coordination of controls between 
agencies”; however, “the main challenges relate to the complex interactions between the 
multiple entities involved, each having their own work culture and wishing to retain their 
modus operandi.”206 Simply put, policy option 3 provides a feasible, if longer-term, 
approach for overcoming this salient challenge.  
Policy option 2, the “tailored modernization” approach, is preferable to option 1 
in that it would likely improve both national homeland security and economic 
competitiveness goals in select industries (such as agriculture, electronics, or 
pharmaceuticals) and would thereby yield additional benefits to U.S. businesses and 
modest improvements to the efficiency of import processes. However, the approach 
discussed under policy option 2 would not move the needle for other industry sectors and 
would likely be stymied by the lack of a unifying work plan or strategy, as offered by 
policy option 3. A small group of agencies might collaborate successfully to streamline 
documentary requirements and simplify procedures identified as problematic within 
certain supply chains. These efforts could be directed by widely available global 
reporting on the most problematic non-tariff barriers to trade, to include the World 
Economic Forum’s border administration index. However, while these activities 
represent the necessary first steps of a trade facilitation reform effort, it remains unlikely 
that the meaningful economic benefits arising from more aggressive steps would be 
accomplished absent significant political will and an articulated strategy for which all 
                                                 
206 Ibid., 14. 
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agencies strove and were held accountable.207 The feasibility of option 2 is complicated 
further by the fact that the current BIEC lacks the statutory authority of the ITDS Board 
of Directors under the Department of Treasury as well as a formal mechanism to seek 
input from private-sector experts. Policy option 3 seeks to address both shortcomings by 
proposing a new governance structure that would distinguish the BIEC’s role from the 
statutory requirements of the ITDS Board and connect both to the private-sector advisory 
network available through the Trade Policy Review Group structure. 
  
                                                 
207 These “more aggressive” trade facilitation measures include activities outlined in the section on 
policy option 2, such as coordinated risk management and increased use of post-clearance audits and 
authorized economic operator programs.  
 94 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 95 
V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter summarizes Chapters I–III, and proposes next steps for 
implementation of the recommended policy option. The chapter concludes by identifying 
remaining questions or issues that were outside the scope of this study, but warrant 
further examination. 
This thesis asserted that the national economy and the vital commercial flows that 
feed it are the sine quibus non of national influence, power, and security. It argued that 
hallmark features of globalization (including lower transportation costs and improved 
information technology) occasioned the rise of a new global trade environment, itself 
characterized by the increased exchanges of intermediate products across political 
borders and a trend toward tariff reductions globally. However, the integration of 
interdependent and “lean” supply chains created an increasingly fragile global supply 
chain system in which even localized shocks could trigger significant disruptions across 
the entirety of the complex system. Added to this mix were the spate of government 
controls, particularly in the United States, established in the wake of the September 11 
terrorist attacks to ensure the security of cross-border trade. These new requirements 
complicated the business of importing goods into the nation by adding time and cost to 
the process; they introduced “friction,” as if “fine sand [had] been sprinkled into the gears 
of American business.”208 
This thesis also argued that, problematically, the modern trade environment is still 
supported and enabled by policies, processes, and information communication 
technologies constructed in and for a previous century. Addressing this gap and ensuring 
government regulators are best situated to respond to the evolving characteristics of a 
dynamic commercial market requires an “all hands on deck” mentality in which relevant 
agencies each leverage their unique authorities and expertise to maintain and promote 
national economic prosperity and, by extension, national economic security. Securing and 
managing the vital flow of international commerce being imported and exported across 
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American borders remains a core mission area of DHS, delegated in large part to CBP. 
DHS works to “improve upon border security, to exclude terrorist threats, drug 
traffickers, and other threats to national security, economic security, and public 
safety.”209 However, as this paper discussed, neither DHS nor CBP have primary roles in 
the development of trade policy, laws, or strategic objectives, but they are responsible for 
the implementation, enforcement, and administration of these policies, laws, and goals. 
This complicates CBP’s ability to drive action among the dozens of different U.S. 
agencies with hundreds of border-related requirements while maintaining the stated 
commitment to both trade facilitation and enforcement. CBP and the broader DHS could 
best position themselves to overcome these challenges by drawing authority from trade 
policymakers (including USTR and the NEC) for the BIEC to serve as the interagency 
body responsible for rationalizing trade enforcement and facilitation activities across the 
U.S. government toward the achievement of a unifying, economy-wide vision of desired 
performance outcomes. This approach, described in detail as policy option 3, “Shifting 
the Paradigm,” would enable CBP to leverage its border authorities to address 
inefficiencies with the current manner in which the U.S. government as a whole manages 
the processing and ensures the security of imported goods. This thesis concluded that 
such an effort could improve trade facilitation and provide commercially meaningful 
benefits to public and private stakeholders alike.  
A. NEXT STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTING POLICY OPTION 3: SHIFTING 
THE PARADIGM  
DHS and the broader interagency would do well to consider a series of near-term 
actions to initiate the reform agenda that may take several years to implement fully. Of 
vital importance will be the development of an outcome-oriented strategic vision for the 
Single Window effort. As explained by this thesis author in the Homeland Security blog,  
Building a Single Window system and modernizing current trade-related 
processes for an economy the size of the United States is a big undertaking 
and an immensely complex challenge. The effort requires close 
coordination among policy, legal, fiscal, and operational offices from 
scores of government agencies. It depends upon active and sustained 
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engagement from an array of private-sector players, to include importers 
and exporters of all sizes, brokers, freight forwarders, software developers 
and more.210  
CBP and the interagency have to-date been guided by statutory requirements for 
the establishment of the Single Window and an executive order that imposed timelines 
for its completion and charged agencies with using the system to improve supply chain 
processes and further prevent illicit or non-compliant shipments.211 Both the law and the 
executive order defined success in two ways, “the degree to which U.S. Government 
agencies are better able to enforce laws at the border; and the extent to which it is easier, 
faster, and cheaper to import and export goods across U.S. borders.”212 However, 
ensuring the coordinated use of the new digital capabilities by the dozens of agencies 
involved will require renewed agreement on the strategic-level “yardstick” by which the 
required measurable improvements will be judged. Despite the stated effort to pursue 
trade facilitation and security as mutually inclusive goals, conflicts between the two will 
certainly arise as government regulators find themselves empowered with better means of 
processing increased data flows and as businesses seek ways to squeeze more efficiency 
out of already lean supply chains. Experts highlight the need for development of a 
common agenda for such an effort, which will inevitably advantage some parties or 
interests over others. They note that the assumption that public and private-sector 
stakeholders “will universally benefit from improved systems and procedures” under 
such reform projects is “frequently incorrect … as all meaningful change creates some 
winners and losers.”213  
The BIEC did work to establish an overarching strategic document for the 
national Single Window project in late 2014. An early draft version of that strategic 
vision made publicly available in 2014 sought to distinguish public and private 
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experiences and capabilities at the time with the vision for the future after completion of 
the Single Window system. The 2014 statement detailed aspirational Single Window 
capabilities as of December 2016 as well as “system capabilities and related activities that the 
U.S. Government will test in the near-term and continue to develop and refine” in the 
future.214 As helpful as the vision document was to developing interagency agreement about 
the salient features that a completed Single Window should have, the effort at that time did 
not speak to the specific ends to which the Single Window should be used once completed 
and available. Therefore, DHS and the interagency should renew efforts to develop and 
make publicly available a strategic vision that goes beyond a description of system 
capabilities and establishes performance outcomes able to be assessed qualitatively or 
quantitatively over time. Again referring to supply chain experts, the development of 
such “service standards are important components of change management endeavors.”215 
After establishing the necessary strategic framework and expected outcomes, 
DHS can and should drive additional efforts to develop a performance management plan 
by which the dozens of agencies with control authorities at the border have the means to 
gauge progress (independently and collectively) toward the strategic outcomes. As 
discussed previously, a variety of U.S. agencies require an array of data as well as access 
to and temporary custody of cross-border shipments for security, safety, health, and 
compliance reasons. However, U.S. government agencies currently have limited insight 
into the average length and causes of cargo delays at the border. This is because of the 
historic reliance on paper-based information exchanges and manual processes that hinder 
data aggregation. With the development of the automated capabilities under the Single 
Window and associated advances in data processing, the U.S. government is well 
positioned to accurately measure the average time taken between the arrival of goods at 
the border and their release by the government. The World Customs Organization 
supports and promulgates guidelines for such efforts, called “Time Release Studies,” 
noting their usefulness in identifying bottlenecks in the import or export process caused 
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by customs, other agencies, or private-sector stakeholders, and providing 
recommendations for process improvements.216 As CBP currently is responsible for 
operating and maintaining the Single Window, the agency could work to program the 
necessary features of a Time Release Study into the system. The resulting data would 
allow performance managers to assess the time, cost, and outcome of agency-specific 
interventions at the border as well as determine aggregate government progress toward 
strategic outcome goals.  
B. ISSUES REQUIRING ADDITIONAL STUDY 
This paper focused primarily on DHS (specifically CBP) policies and activities 
associated with cross-border trade, with a particular emphasis on imported goods. After a 
retrospective examination of the major evolutions in the trade environment brought about 
by globalization and post-9/11 security requirements, it sought to identify viable policy 
options by which the department could support national economic goals in furtherance of 
its stated premise that homeland security supports and is inseparable from economic 
security.  
Importantly, however, additional research into certain topics beyond the scope of 
this paper could inform the continued dialogue and potentially warrant a reconsideration 
of the conclusions drawn here. For example, while this paper focused on imports, the 
challenges and opportunities for promoting and securing American exports is a deserving 
topic of continued inquiry. According to the Department of Commerce, the export of 
goods and services across U.S. borders “supported an estimated 11.5 million U.S. jobs” 
in 2015, with these jobs being dependent upon exports to the 95 percent of world 
consumers who live outside our borders.217 The increase of exports over the last five 
years, up roughly 50 percent to a record high of $2.35 trillion in 2014, is not likely to 
slow in light of the continued exponential growth of e-commerce and the opportunities it 
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brings to U.S. and global exporters.218 As one expert noted, the increased buying and 
selling of goods through online digital platforms has empowered “U.S. small companies 
and entrepreneurs to export, diversify their markets, scale their sales, and expand their 
businesses at a relatively low cost.”219 The U.S. International Trade Commission further 
highlighted the benefits of e-commerce to U.S. exporters of all sizes, noting an estimated 
two-fold increase in productivity when compared to their non-exporting counterparts.220 
With projections of an 8–12 percent e-commerce growth rate and up to $443 billion in 
estimated sales in 2017, further research into the design of global supply chains and the 
adequacy of government security and revenue collection requirements will be 
necessary.221 According to a survey conducted by the U.S. International Trade 
Commission, “50 percent of small and medium sized businesses said customs procedures 
pose a major burden.”222 The concern with customs procedures was particularly acute 
among the subset of small and medium-sized businesses in the manufacturing industry, 
with 48 percent identifying customs as a “major burden” and their top concern.223 Such 
findings support continued efforts among national customs authorities to collaborate on 
the development of internationally recognized standards and best practices and 
harmonized data requirements and processes. Such activities will enable improved 
assessment of risk by government controllers while easing the burden of compliance on 
businesses as they look to take advantage of the new opportunities afforded them through 
digital trade.  
                                                 
218 “U.S. Exports Hit New Annual Record, Reaching $2.35 Trillion in 2014,” Department of 
Commerce, February 5, 2015, http://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2015/02/us-exports-hit-new-
annual-record-reaching-235-trillion-2014. 
219 Kati Suominen, Fueling the Online Revolution: A New Customs Security Framework to Secure 
and Facilitate Small Business eCommerce (New York: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 2.  
220 International Trade Commission, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises: Characteristics and 
Performance (Washington, DC: International Trade Commission, 2010), xi.  
221 “National Retail Federation estimates 8–12% U.S. e-commerce growth in 2017,” Business Insider, 
February 10, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/national-retail-federation-estimates-8-12-us-e-
commerce-growth-in-2017-2017-2. 
222 International Trade Commission, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, 619. 
223 Ibid. 
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In addition to exports, an assessment of DHS’s role in protecting domestic critical 
infrastructure could contribute to an evaluation of the department’s contributions to 
ensuring economic security. A central aspect of DHS’s mission, performed largely by the 
National Protection and Programs Directorate, is to “provide strategic guidance, promote 
a national unity of effort, and coordinate the overall Federal effort to promote the security 
and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure.”224 These critical infrastructure 
sectors include the water, food, and transportation sectors that support and connect 
American cities. They provide vital health, manufacturing, and emergency services to 
citizens, feed our defense industrial base, and provide the information technology and 
energy backbone upon which the entire nation depends. The growing interdependence 
among cyber and physical critical infrastructure sectors, and a large degree of private-
sector ownership of these vital systems, complicates DHS’s protection mission. In 
addition, public and private sectors’ increased use of new technical capabilities such as 
advanced computing, Internet-enabled devises, and cloud computing render these critical 
sectors as well as networks, devices, and citizens more vulnerable to cyber intrusions and 
attacks. With some recent assessments estimating global costs of cyber-crime to exceed 
$6 trillion annually by 2021, future analysis on how DHS could protect the national 
economy so dependent upon these critical infrastructures is warranted.225  
The dynamic nature of the global trade environment and the interests of key 
players in it will create new threats and opportunities; these emerging trends also could 
occasion a reconsideration of this paper’s baseline assumptions and findings. A salient 
example can be found in the rise of what Klaus Schwab of the World Economic Forum 
has identified as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”—the “reshaping of behaviors, 
production, consumption, transportation, and delivery systems” caused by the increasing 
integration of new technologies across the physical, digital, and biological worlds.226 
DHS and the broader U.S. government will not be alone in needing to address the policy 
                                                 
224 Barack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2013).  
225 Steve Morgan, Hackerpocalypse: A Cybercrime Revelation (Torotno: Herjavec Group, 2016), 3, 
https://www.herjavecgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Hackerpocalypse.pdf. 
226 Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2016), 1.  
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and governance challenges resulting from this new digital economy. While new 
capabilities such as artificial intelligence, supercomputing, 3D printing, and networked 
devices can bring tremendous new benefits to the United States and the global market, 
the consequent shift in modes of production away from manual labor toward automation 
and innovation will require fewer workers and could exacerbate income inequality and 
fuel social tensions.227 
In addition, marked shifts to the political environment, both domestically and 
globally, are likely to alter characteristics of the global trade environment and present 
new policy challenges not addressed in this paper. Early indications from the Trump 
administration suggest that the new trade agenda, while inchoate, will depart from 
President Obama’s pursuit of large multilateral trade agreements (such as the Trans-
Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). Instead, the 
administration will look to deliver on its hallmark “American first” message when 
considering new trade agreements, establishing import and export requirements and 
controls, and exercising its powers to combat unfair trade practices through the 
imposition of protectionist measures. According to the recently released 2017 Trade 
Policy Agenda, the top trade priorities of the new administration include:  
[Defending] U.S. national sovereignty over trade policy; strictly 
[enforcing] U.S. trade laws; [using] all possible sources of leverage to 
encourage other countries to open their markets to U.S. exports of goods 
and services … and [negotiating] new and better trade deals with countries 
in key markets around the world.228  
The domestic skepticism of international institutions, global cooperation, and 
market-driven globalization is reflective of a more pervasive global trend and presents a 
unique set of policy and governance challenges. However, the new administration’s focus 
on “improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the executive branch” 
and commitment to service-based and outcome-oriented government requirements 
                                                 
227 Klaus Schwab, “A New Narrative for Globalization,” World Economic Forum, March 17, 2017, 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/klaus-schwab-new-narrative-for-globalization. 
228 USTR, 2017 Trade Policy, 2. 
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presents opportunities for positive change as well.229 In today’s charged atmosphere, 
with political and social tensions deepening divides within and between nations around 
the world, it is helpful to conclude with a reminder offered again by Klaus Schwab from 
the World Economic Forum:  
The tension between globalism and nationalism is artificial. We have to 
manage our future based on the fact that we are simultaneously local, 
national and global citizens with overlapping responsibilities and 
identities.230 
  
                                                 
229 Donald J. Trump, Presidential Executive Order on a Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the 
Executive Branch (Washington, DC: White House, 2017). See also Donald J. Trump, Presidential 
Executive Order on Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2017) and Donald J. Trump, Presidential Executive Order on Enforcing the Regulatory Reform 
Agenda (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), which both seek to lower the regulatory burden on the 
American people by imposing new requirements on federal agencies prior to the promulgation of 
requirements.  
230 Schwab, “A New Narrative for Globalization.” 
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Table 8.   Comparison of Trade Facilitation Indicators 
World Economic Forum239 
Enabling Trade Index (ETI) 
World Bank240 
Performance Logistics Index 
(PLI) 
OECD 
Trade Facilitation Index (TFI) 





• Customs service index 
• Effectiveness/efficiency of 
clearance process 
• Time to import 
• Cost to import  
Customs 
The efficiency of customs and border 
management clearance 
Information Availability 
Publication of trade information, 
availability of enquiry points 
 
Publication and Availability of 
Information 
 





Involvement of the Trade 
Community 
 
Opportunity to Comment 
Opportunity to comment information 
before entry into force and 
consultation 
Availability and Quality of 
Transport Services 
Ease of Arranging Shipments 
The ease of arranging competitively 
priced shipments 
Advance Rulings  
 Advance Rulings 
Foreign Market Access 
Tariff barriers faced by a country’s 
exporters in destination markets 
Quality of Logistic Services 
The competence and quality of 
logistics services—trucking, 
forwarding, and customs brokerage 
Appeal Procedures Procedures for Appeal or Review 
                                                 
239 World Economic Forum and the Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation, Global Enabling Trade Report, 14.  
240 The World Bank, Connecting to Compete, 6.  
241 World Trade Organization, “Agreement on Trade Facilitation.” 
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World Economic Forum 
Enabling Trade Index (ETI) 
World Bank 
Performance Logistics Index 
(PLI) 
OECD 
Trade Facilitation Index (TFI) 




Domestic Market Access 
The level and complexity of a 
country’s tariff protection as a result 
of its trade policy 
Tracking and Tracing 
The ability to track and trace 
consignments 
Governance and Impartiality 
 
Other Measures 
To enhance impartiality, non-
discrimination, and transparency  
 
Operating Environment  
Quality of a country’s operating 
environment, which impacts the 
capacity of companies that export, 
import, trade, and/or transport 
merchandise to do business 
Timeliness 
The frequency with which shipments 
reach consignees within scheduled or 
expected delivery times 
Fees and Charges 
Disciplines on the fees and charges 
imposed on imports and exports 
 
Formalities Connected with the 
Importation and Exportation and 
Transit 
• Documentation requirements 
• Acceptance of copies 
• Use of international standards 
• Single Window 
• Pre-shipment inspection 
• Use of customs brokers 
• Return of rejected goods 
• Temporary admission of goods 
Availability and Use of Information 
and Communication Technologies 
As approximated by the use of mobile 
telephony and Internet 
 
Documents 
Simplification of trade documents; 
harmonization in accordance with 
international standards; acceptance of 
copies 
Release and Clearance of Goods 
• Pre-arrival processing 
• Electronic payment 
• Separation of release from final 
duties, taxes, fees 
• Risk management 
• Post-clearance audit 
• Publication of average release 
times 
• Authorized economic operators 
• Expedited shipments 
• Prioritizing perishable goods 
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World Economic Forum 
Enabling Trade Index (ETI) 
World Bank 
Performance Logistics Index 
(PLI) 
OECD 
Trade Facilitation Index (TFI) 






Streamlining of border controls; single 
submission points for all required 
documentation (single windows); 
post-clearance audits; authorized 
economic operators 
Border Agency Cooperation 
  
Automation  
Electronic exchange of data; 
automated border procedures; use of 
risk management 
Movements of Goods under 




Cooperation between various border 
agencies of the country; control 
delegation to customs authorities 
Customs Cooperation 
• Measures promoting compliance 
and cooperation 
• Exchange of information 
• Verification 
• Documentation requests 
• Protection and confidentiality 
• Provision of information 
• Postponement or refusal of 
request 
• Reciprocity 
• Administrative burden 
  
Cooperation (External) 
Cooperation with foreign countries 
 
Disciplines 
on fees and charges imposed or in 
connection with imports/exports 
   Freedom of Transit 
   Bilateral and Regional Agreements 
Gray shading represents similar indicators among the various organizations. The World Economic Forum’s “border administration” indicator includes 
the shaded indicators provided by the World Bank and the OECD and, for reference, the trade facilitation requirements under the World Trade 
Organization’s trade facilitation agreement. 
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Table 9.   Comparison of Enabling Trade Index Coverage from 2008–2014242 
YEAR U.S. Total 
ETI Rank 
U.S. Score U.S. Border 
Admin 
Rank/Score 
Changes in Coverage Total 
# 
2008 14th  5.4 21st/5.3  118 
2010 19th  5.0 19th/5.6 9 Added:  





2 Removed:  
Uzbekistan, Moldova 
125 
2012 23rd  4.9 20th/5.4 7 Added: 




2014 15th  5.0  21st/5.7 8 Added: 
Bhutan, Gabon, 
Guinea, Lao PDR, 
Liberia, Libya, Malta, 
Myanmar 
2 Removed:  




                                                 
242 Adapted from Lawrence et al., The Global Enabling Trade Report 2008; Lawrence et al., The 
Global Enabling Trade Report 2010; Lawrence, Hanouz, and Doherty, The Global Enabling Trade Report 
2012; Hanouz, Geiger, and Doherty, The Global Enabling Trade Report 2014. 
The addition of new economies to the enabling trade index from 2008–2014 had only a nominal impact 
on the U.S. ranking. In fact, the addition of Ireland in 2010 was the only situation in which a newly added 
economy impacted the U.S. rank by achieving score and ranking higher than the United States. When 
finally included, Ireland ranked 21st in 2010 (compared to the United States’ 19th place position) and 22nd 
in 2012 (compared to the United States’ 23rd place position). All other economies added in 2010, 2012, 
and 2014 were ranked well below the United States; therefore, while they added to the overall totals for 
each year, they did not impact U.S. overall ranks relative to those totals.  
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Table 10.   World Economic Forum Enabling Trade Index, Global Rankings for 
Border Administration Indicator Category (2008–2014)243 
Rank 2008 2010 2012 2014 
1 Singapore (6.51) Singapore (6.56) Singapore (6.53) Singapore (6.3) 
2 Sweden (6.32) Sweden (6.32) Sweden (6.35) Finland (6.2) 
3 New Zealand (6.16) Denmark (6.22) Denmark (6.22) Sweden (6.2) 
4 Finland (6.15) Netherlands (6.03) Hong Kong (6.02) Netherlands (6.1) 
5 Denmark (6.10) New Zealand (6.02) Netherlands (6.00) Japan (6.0) 
6 Norway (6.06) Hong Kong (5.96) New Zealand (5.99) New Zealand (6.0) 
7 Hong Kong (5.99) Ireland (5.86) Finland (5.88) UK (6.0) 
8 Netherlands (5.98) Finland (5.83) Japan (5.83) Estonia (5.9) 
9 Canada (5.78) Austria (5.77) UK (5.80) Denmark (5.9) 
10 Luxemburg (5.77) Switzerland (5.76) Ireland (5.79) Austria (5.8) 
Total 6.08 6.03 6/04 6.04 
  
                                                 
243 Adapted from Lawrence et al., The Global Enabling Trade Report 2008; Lawrence et al., The 
Global Enabling Trade Report 2010; Lawrence, Hanouz, and Doherty, The Global Enabling Trade Report 
2012; Hanouz, Geiger, and Doherty, The Global Enabling Trade Report 2014. 
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Table 11.   World Bank Logistics Performance Indicators, Global Rankings for 
Customs Indicator Category (2007–2014)244 
Rank 2007 2010 2012 2014 
1 Netherlands (3.99) Luxemburg (4.04) Singapore (4.10) Norway (4.21) 
2 Denmark (3.97) Singapore (4.02) Finland (3.98) Germany (4.10) 
3 Singapore (3.90) Germany (4.00) Hong Kong (3.97) Singapore (4.01) 
4 Germany (3.88) Netherlands (3.98) Denmark (3.93) Netherlands (3.96) 
5 Switzerland (3.85) Sweden (3.88) Switzerland (3.88) UK (3.94) 
6 Sweden (3.85) Norway (3.86) Germany (3.87) New Zealand (3.92) 
7 Hong Kong (3.84) Finland (3.86) Belgium (3.85) Switzerland (3.92) 
8 Austria (3.83) Hong Kong (3.83) Netherlands (3.85) Finland (3.89) 
9 Canada (3.82) Belgium (3.83) Austria (3.77) Australia (3.85) 
10 Ireland (3.82) Japan (3.79) UK (3.73) Luxemburg (3.82) 
Total 3.87 3.90 3.89 3.96 
 
  
                                                 
244 Adapted from World Bank, Doing Business 2007; Doing Business 2010; Doing Business 2012; 
Doing Business 2014. 
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Table 12.   Criterion 1: The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Import Processes245 
Criterion 1: The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Import Processes 
Would the policy improve U.S. ratings in the World Economic Forum’s Border 
Administration category? 









Customs Service Index (0–12 points)  
• clearance of shipments via electronic data interchange  
• separation of physical release of goods from fiscal control  
• full-time automated processing  
• customs working hours adapted to commercial needs  
• fee for services conducted during normal service hours  
• inspection / release of goods arriving by air by the operator’s facility 
• automated risk assessment as basis for physical exam of shipments  
• # and promptness of inspections by agencies other than customs 
• exemptions from full customs for shipments of minimal value 
• exemptions from duties and taxes for shipments of minimal value  
• clearance of shipments by a third party 








































Effectiveness / Efficiency of Clearance Process (0–4 points) 
• advanced information 
• post-clearance audits 
• authorized economic operators 
















Time for Import (0–2 points) 
• less days to import 










Documents for Import (0–2 points) 
• less documents/information required 











Cost to Import (0–3 points)  
• improved predictability  
• IT requirements  













TOTAL SCORE 11 19 22 
 
                                                 
245 Adapted from World Economic Forum and Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation, Global 
Enabling Trade Report 2016, 14. 
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Table 13.   Criterion 2: Benefit to U.S. Businesses 
Criterion 2: Benefit to U.S. Businesses 
Would the policy provide improvements that could address COAC recommendations 
focused on trade facilitation? (Y/N) 
Policy 
Option # COAC Trade Facilitation Recommendations  
 Industry Partnerships Automation 
Other Government 
Agencies Info/Transparency TOTAL 
1 N Y N Y 2 
2 Y Y Y Y 4 





Figure 13.  Criterion 3: Feasibility of Implementation 
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